many years into liberation movement ranks and the direct recruitment of a significant number of black Zimbabweans into the repressive Rhodesian system. What was the balance of forces in the liberation movement? How strong was the commitment to a fundamental transformation of the embedded Rhodesian machinery and its doctrines? With regard to capacity it is clear that even ZANU (ZANLA) and ZAPU (ZPRA) combined did not have sufficient capacity to overwhelm and rapidly overhaul the Rhodesian state and security system without undermining the broader frameworks, which had underpinned the Lancaster House compromise agreement. Once the two liberation parties parted ways this capacity was further reduced. Whilst we may debate these questions long and hard without reaching an agreement, we could perhaps for the sake of this discussion simply concede that the challenges were enormous, the commitment was somewhat ambivalent and the capacity was insufficient. Divisions, inter-party rivalry and then the direct assault on ZAPU, ZPRA and communities in western Zimbabwe, which emerged in the early 1980’s, obviously made prospects for transformation even worse. The transformation agenda since 1980 A common assumption by many younger Zimbabweans today is that a major transformation of state institutions and doctrine took place soon after independence in 1980. This was not actually the case, certainly with regard to the security sector. In the first instance the majority of liberation fighters remained contained in Assembly Points for a significant period after the ceasefire and their influence on prospects for transformation was severely curtailed. This certainly reduced the momentum for, and content of, the radical transformation agenda. Nationalist politicians dominated the political landscape in the immediate post-independence period and the Rhodesians still dominated the security establishment. When former liberation fighters were demobilized this operation was conducted and managed by the former Rhodesian forces in their own bases and barracks. When they were integrated into the newly established Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) this process too was managed by the Rhodesian security establishment, with assistance from British military advisors who seldom managed to hide their sympathy with the Rhodesians. This had a major impact on the transformation prospects and process in the national army for several years. Very few former liberation fighters were integrated into the other security services (police, intelligence and prisons) in those first years after independence, whilst the air force remained entirely unchanged. As for the newly established Government, its circumstances are well depicted by the late Comrade Edison Zvobgo who compared his first day as a Minister to being “a 8