This complex task requires dealing collectively with past, present and future exigencies, often in a
context of acute resource limitations and adverse political conditions. Such conditions vary in each
transitional context, and what can be achieved in terms of justice and accountability is often largely
dependent on the nature of the specific obstacles and opportunities that present themselves.
Although the study of transitional justice situations and options remains relatively new, past
experience demonstrates there are many similarities in terms of the challenges that are faced in
the aftermath of political transitions from authoritarian rule. As such, we should learn from the
experiences of others, in order to explore and develop a range of justice and accountability options.
Such initiatives will be central to the rebuilding and consolidation of administrative and judicial
systems that are premised on respect for the rule of law and the protection of human rights.
Transitional justice and Zimbabwe
The situation in Zimbabwe presents a related, yet somewhat different, challenge. This is not a
post-conflict dispensation and the country remains in the grip of a repressive nationalistic regime.
Prospects for meaningful change in the short term remain doubtful. Indeed, the situation looks
set to continue deteriorating, especially in the wake of ZANU(PF)’s victory in the March 2005
parliamentary elections, and the subsequent systematic purging and relocation of the urban poor
under the auspices of ‘Operation Murambatsvina’.3
Consequently, prevailing conditions circumscribe the extent to which many unattended issues of
justice and accountability are and can be freely aired and discussed. Repression and fear continue to
pervade the realities and consciousness of the general population, as well as those who endeavour
to further justice and accountability agenda. Efforts to employ domestic and international remedies
that might address contemporaneous violations have had limited success, and have not prevented
further violations and authoritarianism. In fact, the situation in Zimbabwe has been exacerbated by
the anticipated introduction of new legislation ostensibly designed to regulate the non-governmental
sector, but in reality intended to prevent the monitoring and documentation of human rights
violations, as NGOs may be prohibited from receiving foreign funding for work dealing with issues
of human rights and governance.4
These remain profoundly complex and controversial issues. The situation in Zimbabwe is further
complicated as issues of human rights have been routinely manipulated, denied and distorted
by the government and ruling party for partisan interests. Relentless propaganda has subverted
meaningful debate around a broad range of social and economic concerns (such as the controversial
land reform process) and ongoing civil and political violations are routinely denied or blamed
primarily on opposition elements. Overwhelming evidence of systemic abuse is simply ignored
or dismissed as neo-imperialist propaganda. Domestic organisations that continue to expose these
abuses are labelled as imperialist fellow-travellers, doing the bidding of countries determined to
undermine Zimbabwe’s sovereignty.5
3
See Order out of Chaos, or Chaos out of Order? A Preliminary Report on Operation Murambatsvina, A Report by the Zimbabwe
Human Rights NGO Forum, June 2005.
4
The legislation, the Non-Governmental Organisations Bill, was passed by Parliament but, for reasons that are not clear,
the President refused to assent to it. There have been suggestions that in due course it will be reintroduced in Parliament,
albeit in a modified form: Zim Online, 26 July 2005.
5
Without presenting any factual substantiation, ZANU has a long history of labelling its opponents as imperialists or
imperialist fellow travellers. In a 1976 document, entitled, ‘ZANU – Be Vigilant’, the late Vice-President, Joshua Nkomo,
in his capacity as the head of ZAPU, was described as “the lackey of all imperialist reactionaries … untrustworthy and
unreliable”.
2