For a number of years, NGOs such as the Amani Trust have been advocating the development of reparation and compensation packages to assist victims and survivors of organised violence and torture. At the same time, the Amani Trust and others have been trying to build a ‘victim constituency’ that can articulate and advocate around these concerns. During the course of the interviews, the writer was also informed about a pilot initiative in 1999 from the President’s office (in conjunction with some church groupings and traditional leaders) to explore the problems and needs of victims, with a view to possible compensation. The initiative apparently established provincial structures to engage with grass roots communities, but evidently could not guarantee the control of information for government. In the wake of the 2000 Referendum, it appeared the government had developed ‘cold feet’ and the process had subsequently ‘petered out’. The process did, however, generate a lot of interest in many communities, which highlights the importance of developing a broader constituency and lobby to advocate around these issues (i.e. church, social movements, etc.). Institutional transformation Countries in transition from an authoritarian past often need to adopt institutional, legal and policy reforms that will enable the country to achieve the long-term social, economic and political objectives that are essential to preventing civic and/or democratic collapse in the future. Such reforms generally have as their aim the elimination of the conditions that led to and maintained prior conflict or repression. The range of possible reforms is extremely broad and includes: removing abusers from public positions, creating new institutions to protect human rights, dismantling or restructuring institutions prone to abuse, implementing human rights training and professionalisation policies and programmes, and introducing legal and constitutional amendments to enhance good governance and better protect human rights.29 In Zimbabwe, the police and military have in varying degrees played a partisan political role since independence. In more recent years, the heads and other senior members of both the police and army have made public statements committing the loyalty of the security forces to the ruling party and denouncing the MDC opposition as violent, treasonous and the enemy of the State. Partisan policing, selective prosecution, the non-enforcement of court orders and so on, have all contributed to the declining legitimacy of the country’s criminal justice system. In addition, the integrity and independence of the judiciary is increasingly questioned. Although pockets of honesty evidently remain, it is increasingly apparent that Zimbabwe’s judicial system has been deeply compromised, especially over the last four years.30 Developing a clearer picture of exactly what has transpired will in turn provide a more realistic understanding of what actions (in terms of training, lustration, policy development, etc.) needs to be taken in order to rectify the situation. Most transitional situations are constrained by a fundamental lack of detailed information in this regard. Some aspects of the identification process have already 29 ICTJ, ‘Background Paper’, p. 29. See, for example, Justice in Zimbabwe, Legal Resources Foundation, 2002; An Overview of the Human Rights Situation in Zimbabwe, with Specific Reference to Repressive Legislation, Impunity, the State of the Administration of Justice and Selective Application of the Law, Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, 2004; as well as sections on Zimbabwe in the annual reports – Attacks on Justice: A Global Report on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers – by the Centre for the Independence of Judges and Lawyers of the International Commission of Jurists, <http://www.icj.org>. See also The State of Justice in Zimbabwe, a report to the International Council of Advocates and Barristers by five Common Law Bars into the state of justice in Zimbabwe. 30 15