Although a number of NGOs and other civil society actors have called for justice and accountability in relation to human rights violations over the years, this meeting and its recommendations represented the first significant attempt by civil society groupings to introduce a more comprehensive and holistic agenda to secure justice and accountability. By tying these issues to prospective political dialogue, it was an important attempt to position these considerations at centre-stage. Party political positions The Movement for Democratic Change Members and supporters of the MDC have been the primary targets of contemporary violations by State security agencies and their proxy forces.13 The party has consistently called for accountability, an end to partisan policing (and prosecutions) and a return to the rule of law. Understandably, the party’s focus has remained on recent violations in the post-1999 period, although it acknowledges the importance of addressing all relevant abuses from both the colonial and post-colonial periods. Initially, the MDC approached the issue of retrospective accountability with some degree of caution, seeking policy advice on a broad range of transitional justice options from the New York-based International Center for Transitional Justice. The ICTJ was able to provide some generic advice on what had been attempted elsewhere but, having no specific experience of Zimbabwe, was unable to make country-specific recommendations. In addition, it appears no advice was given to how best to engage civil society on these matters. Prior to the August 2003 Symposium, and in a context where talks between the MDC and ZANU(PF) seemed possible, the MDC informally raised concerns with the conference organisers about the timing of the conference, indicating that a hard-line position from civil society on issues of retrospective accountability might be counter-productive, prompting the ruling party to ‘dig in its heels’. In retrospect, and in light of the fact that political talks never produced tangible progress, senior members of the MDC informed the writer that they recognised the value of civil society taking an independent and principled position on these issues. Regrettably, the MDC failed to respond to requests in late 2003 from the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum and the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition for a meeting to discuss the ‘Johannesburg Declaration’. The MDC and key civil society organisations had already reached agreement on a number of the principles of transition, so it was not surprising that transitional justice considerations were subsequently raised and formally adopted at the party’s December 2003 Congress. As part of a slew of policy positions, the party highlighted a series of measures it would take under the rubric of ‘constitutionalism, truth and justice’. Included amongst these were a number of broad commitments to a transitional justice agenda. “We will establish mechanisms for truth, justice and reconciliation and restitution. A Truth Commission will be established to gather evidence on human rights abuses reported to the public and to make recommendations on a course of action to government. While general provisions of amnesty for prisoners will continue, we will ensure that due legal process is applied to all human rights abuses, and provide for systems at community, traditional, social and national level to provide for restitution and reparation and for the rehabilitation of perpetrators of abuses.” 13 See, for example, Playing with Fire, Zimbabwe Institute, March 2004. This report provides personal accounts of human rights abuses experienced by 50 opposition MDC Members of Parliament in Zimbabwe, and 28 opposition election candidates. Also, see Disturbing the Peace: An overview of civilian arrests in Zimbabwe: February 2003 January 2004, Solidarity Peace Trust, July 2004. 9