mobilise the military and militia. The action mirrored Mugabe’s response to the referendum defeat of 2000, referred to at the outset, though it surpassed that response in the degree and extent of violence meted out to MDC supporters and perceived supporters. The brutal military crackdown on the opposition was euphemistically referred to as Operation Mavhoterapapi (Where you put your ‘X’ or how did you vote.) It is during this period that Mbeki sought to allow the arms shipment carried by the An Jue Jiang to be delivered to Zimbabwe. It is not as though Mbeki was unaware of the violence. He had dispatched a team of Generals from the SANDF to report on the situation in Zimbabwe. The team apparently detailed the extent of the violence in a graphic fashion. Like the Khampepe report before it, this report was never made public by Mbeki. The extent of the violence rendered participation in the election by Tsvangirai and observation of the process, impossible. Without any real monitoring taking place, ZANU PF was left to present whatever results it wanted for the one man election. It did not miss the opportunity, claiming an 85% “victory” for Mugabe, with a slightly increased voter turn out from the first election, despite the boycott by the MDC. The extent of the electoral farce precluded even the usually sympathetic election observers who had been allowed in by ZANU PF, from endorsing the election. They unanimously pronounced that the election did not reflect the will of the people. Mugabe, however, had himself sworn in as president a few hours before the results had been officially announced and within hours jetted off to an AU summit in Cairo. Two weeks later he attended a SADC meeting. At both these forums he was invited and attended as “President of Zimbabwe” despite the universal rejection of the election. However, Botswana unequivocally refused to recognise Mugabe’s presidency, and other SADC states, including even South Africa, prevaricated on the issue. The correct course of action would have been for SADC to refuse to recognise the obviously fraudulent result and to demand a fresh election, independently supervised. Instead, Mbeki moved quickly to help Mugabe out of his “legitimacy crisis”. While the MDC proposed a transitional government leading to fresh elections, Mbeki quickly doused any such aspirations. After protracted negotiations, the MDC leadership, under extensive pressure from Mbeki, agreed to a government of national unity. Most significantly, the unity agreement recognised Mugabe as president of Zimbabwe with immediate effect and agreed that he would “continue” to hold office. Mbeki had thus, for the moment at least, resolved Mugabe’s legitimacy crisis. The agreement left Mugabe’s powers largely unfettered and intact, though under a restructured form of government. The implementation of this restructuring was to require further and extended negotiations. In particular, Tsvangirai’s appointment as Prime Minister under the agreement (with singularly amorphous powers) was to come later, depended on Mugabe’s discretion (which he has so far declined to exercise) and relied on a constitutional amendment (which would have to be approved by ZANU PF) before this post had any status in law. During this period Mugabe has used every opportunity to flaunt his “re-election” and recognition on the international stage, while humiliating Tsvangirai by refusing to allow his passport to be renewed.