level, the law in question must be precise, accessible and clear for affected people to have the possibility of learning the extent to which the law affects their fundamental rights. This speaks to the form of the law. At a substantive level, the law in question must be equally applicable to everyone in such a way that it cannot be said to be applicable to a specific group of people. The law must be devoid of arbitrary application.29 Equality before the law and equal protection of the law is then amplified through this requirement of general application. That approach confirms a society based on equality. As will be discussed later, all laws restricting artistic freedom must conform to the requirements of section 86(2) lest the decisions taken to limit it will be contrary to the Constitution, hence null and void. Further, restrictions on artistic expression based on political, religious or moral grounds in the absence of a law to back them will have to be challenged as unlawful under the 2013 Constitution. In other words, it is no longer enough simply to make reference to a law in order to limit the right. The law, especially statutes that preceded the 2013 Constitution, must earn the status of law by meeting constitutional standards of a law discussed above. 1.4 Judicial decisions bearing on artistic freedom As demonstrated above, artistic freedom is a fundamental component of the right to freedom of expression. Freedom of expression was described as one of the most precious of all the guaranteed freedoms in the case of In Re Munhumeso,30 where it was broadly considered to serve the following special purposes; first, it helps an individual retain his/her autonomy and to obtain self-fulfilment. This individual-autonomy argument is essential to artistic freedom as censorship acts to restrict the artist’s ability to fully express him or herself to others and thus interferes with self-fulfilment i.e. his/her ability to attain the full development of his/her intellect, interests, tastes and See Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (3) SA 936 at page 47. See also President of South Africa v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC). 30 In Re Munhumeso and Ors 1994 (1) ZLR 49 (SC) 29 23 | P a g e