and context in which they are offered (Brooks 1999, Barkan 2000, de Greiff 2006). Still, when combined with apologies, truth-telling, and other measures, reparations have the potential to improve relations. Perhaps more importantly, leaving identifiable harms uncompensated may undermine the effectiveness of apologies and other efforts to reconcile. depending on how much victims give up in forgiving, this kind of reconciliation may be purchased at the cost of justice (Blustein, 2014). In contrast, those who think of forgiving as the overcoming of resentment often argue that victims can forgive yet also call for punishment, reparations and remembrance of the wrong (J. Murphy 2003). Reparations for historical injustice are particularly controversial. One ongoing debate concerns the guilt or liability of those who would pay, the claim-rights and connection to the victims of those who would receive payment, and the difficulty in calculating the proper sum of restitution (Waldron 1992, Wheeler 1997, Boxill 2003). Such debates suggest that reparations are being interpreted as restitution, where the legalistic logic of property rights and inheritance are paramount, rather than under the broader project of repairing relationships (Thompson 2002, Brooks 2004). Victims and their descendants sometimes worry that accepting reparation payments may be seen as drawing a line under the past or that all is forgiven (Barkan 2000). They also object to the suggestion that the people and other valuable things lost could be repaid by money or other material goods. However, no matter how one defines forgiveness, the claim that victims should forgive in order to bring about valuable reconciliation is likely to be controversial because it asks the very people who were most deeply insulted and wronged by the past conflict to bear the burden of repairing it. Another point of concern is whether the victims are being asked to forgive unconditionally or conditionally (Garrard and McNaughton 2011). Furthermore, whether or not a particular act of forgiveness would be morally appropriate, virtuous, or even prudent for the victim, pressuring a victim to forgive is widely regarded as problematic (Govier and Verwoerd 2002b).Efforts to make forgiveness central to reconciliation also run into questions about who has the standing to forgive. To presume to forgive on behalf of a living victim is morally unacceptable, if not simply impossible (Govier and Verwoerd 2002b). Some theorists also hold that it is impossible to forgive on behalf of deceased victims, from which it follows that wrongs such as murder will be unforgivable (Jankélévitch 2005). h) Forgiveness The relationship between forgiveness and reconciliation is equally contentious. Can parties be reconciled if forgiveness is refused? Is forgiveness genuine if victims refuse to restore relationships with the wrongdoers? Similar disagreements over the nature of forgiveness complicate matters even further. In the literature on interpersonal forgiveness, definitions of forgiveness commonly focus on the overcoming or forswearing of resentment that were the result of wrongdoing, and the reestablishment of positive attitudes, such as goodwill, toward the wrongdoer (J. Murphy 2003, Pettigrove 2012). Where such changes in attitude do not occur, but where the parties to the wrong manage to reestablish peaceful coexistence, cooperation or even trust, talk of reconciliation seems reasonable. This would be a case of reconciliation without forgiveness. Similarly, a victim might let go of her resentment of someone who mistreated her and yet take steps to avoid future contact with that person out of concern for her safety. Such a case exhibits forgiveness without reconciliation. Forgiveness and reconciliation, on this account, appear to be distinct and independent phenomena. Still, the attitude-centered account of forgiveness is compatible with the view that forgiving is a powerful means to reconciliation. The sorts of negative attitudes that are overcome by forgiveness are powerful obstacles to good relations. Reconciliation that does not include forgiveness is less complete than one that does include forgiveness. When commentators work with a different conception of forgiveness, the discussion of reconciliation is also different. If one thinks of forgiveness as relinquishing a right to hold a wrong against a wrongdoer, then it seems forgiveness may well be productive of reconciliation. However, 4. Reconciliation and Justice Wrongdoing has implications for multiple moral values, including justice. Justice-based concerns traditionally dominated philosophical discussions of responding to wrongdoing. What is the relationship between justice and reconciliation? This question occurs most explicitly in the political context, especially in debates about the moral justifiability of non-punitive responses to wrongdoing such as TRCs. Whether reconciliation is compatible with justice depends on how one conceives of justice. For many theorists, justice is assumed to be ‘retributive justice’, though this is subject to dispute (Moellendorf 1997, Lenta 2000). The core claim of retributivists is that perpetrators of wrongdoing deserve to suffer a proportional punishment. Justice is a matter of holding wrongdoers accountable by giving them the negative treatment they deserve. Against this background, one view is that reconciliation and justice are in tension with one another. Whereas justice focuses on delivering a punishment that fits the past crime, reconciliation is concerned with bringing about future good relations. The conflict between justice and reconciliation is visible when individuals or communities choose non-punitive responses in hopes of securing peace. According to one view, insofar as transitional societies do not punish wrongdoers, they promote reconciliation at a significant moral cost: they sacrifice justice. Authors debate whether this sacrifice is morally justified, given the exigencies of transitional 10