Legislation plays a crucial role in setting the framework for complaints procedures and a system of timely and effective investigations. Relevant legislation should include the following: - - Instituting or facilitating complaints procedures, in particular by obliging authorities to respond to complaints within a specified timeline; Providing that the competent authorities commence investigations ex officio;138 Abolishing any legislation that may result in delays or lack of investigations, such as amnesty or immunity provisions and the need for prior administrative authorisation to investigate;139 Setting timelines for the completion of investigations, including for specific steps to be taken;140 Providing investigating bodies with adequate powers to carry out speedy and effective investigations, such as effective access to police and army facilities; Granting procedural rights and remedies to victims so as to enable them to challenge inaction or expedite proceedings;141 Introducing a criminal offence of dereliction of duty where investigating officers fail to take the requisite measures.142 Legislation should be complemented by administrative rules, such as circulars, guiding the role of national authorities, including in particular: - clear instructions on prompt action in torture cases; - clear instructions concerning the taking of investigative steps; - disciplinary measures against those failing to take requisite steps. Institutional and procedural reforms The reform of investigating and prosecuting bodies must seek to ensure that investigating bodies are sufficiently independent, have the requisite capacity to investigate, are vested with the necessary powers and are subject to adequate oversight. - - Independence: Any body set up or responsible to investigate torture cases should be free of any conflict of interest that may arise from close institutional links and should be able to operate independently of political considerations.143 Resources: The lack of sufficient resources frequently results in a lack of action or resort to short-cuts by investigating bodies. Officials working for under-resourced bodies will also be more susceptible to bribery that may slow down or halt investigations.144 Investigating bodies must therefore be given sufficient resources to conduct investigations effectively. 138 See for example in Georgia, Articles 24 (4), 261, 263, 264 of the recently adopted Criminal Procedure Code of 2005 and for further information, REDRESS/Article 42, Georgia at the Crossroads: Time to ensure justice and accountability for torture, August 2005. 139 Barrios Altos v. Peru (Reparations and Costs), para.44 (b) and Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: Turkey, UN Doc. CAT/C/CR/30/5, 27 May 2003, para.4 c (positive aspects): “…the elimination of the requirement to obtain administrative permission to prosecute a civil servant or public official…” 140 See, for example Article 271 of the Georgian Criminal Procedure Code of 2005. 141 See in particular the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on the unreasonable length of proceedings under Article 6 and the need to provide domestic remedies for breaches in this respect flowing from Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights whose rationale could also be applied to investigations and prosecutions, see Kudla v. Poland, paras.150 et seq. 142 See e.g. Article 203 of the Revised Criminal Code of the Philippines. 143 See for example the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, www.policeombudsman.org. 144 So for example in Russia, see Demos, Reforming law enforcement: overcoming arbitrary work practices, Moscow, 2005. 30