This CMIBrief is part of the CMI project Election processes, liberation and democratic change in Africa led by Professor Lise Rakner and Professor Helge Rønning. Authors: Professor Alois Mlambo and Professor Brian Raftopoulos Editor: Ingvild Hestad Layout: Ola Roth Johnsen The assumption that a quick election will resolve the Zimbabwe crisis is one of the most dangerous propositions currently argued by some of the players in Zimbabwe. for Mugabe to play on Britain’s colonial legacy and the often ‘clumsy positioning’ of the British government in the crises. Minister. • The loss of confidence in state institutions and a growing cynicism over the experience of an inclusive government CHALLENGES AHEAD • The convergence of interests between parties Notwithstanding these problems, the GPA has over the accumulation of resources also seen some progress in the politics of the • Long delays in the implementation of a country. Progress can be seen with a certain constitutional review process degree of stabilisation in the economy and the • Divisions in civil society over the GPA drastic disappearance of hyper-inflation. Some • The opposition’s inability to provide an progress is also evident on the political front, with alternative political strategy for state power the appointment of the Electoral, Human Rights and Media Commissions and the introduction of The Zimbabwean crisis illustrates the a Reserve Bank reform Bill that will remove the complexity of attempting to defeat a party capacity of the Reserve Bank Governor to carry of liberation through elections in a region in out the kind of quasi fiscal activities that helped which the legacies of anti-colonial struggles to sustain ZANU-PF. Moreover, the Mugabe regime still have a great deal of resonance. Within this has been forced to become more accountable resonance, the demands for human rights and to parliament and in cabinet decision-making, political democratisation can be constructed while the Joint Monitoring and Implementation as an extension of a Western regime change Committee (JOMIC), which was set up to monitor agenda. The crisis also reveals the limitations of the implementation of the GPA, has provided SADC as a regional organisation for dealing with an important forum for continued negotiations ruling parties that refuse to adhere to its formal between the parties. The overall effect of these democratic principles by resting their tenure efforts has been a reduction, though not complete on a liberation struggle and coercion. With removal, of political violence in the country. these limitations the Zimbabwean opposition is forced to fight for space within the GPA in These small steps of progress could however, very hopes of creating the conditions for an election quickly evaporate if there is a hasty move to hold that would allow for the possibility of a power new elections before a fuller implementation of transfer. the GPA. The assumption that a quick election will resolve the Zimbabwe crisis is one of the At the same time, an election that does not most dangerous propositions currently argued deal with the tendency for the regime to use for by some of the players in Zimbabwe. As the military-security complex as a means demonstrated in the 2008 election, the challenge for resisting power transfers is not likely to today is not found in an inability of the opposition move Zimbabwe beyond the dilemmas that to win elections, but the inability to translate an gave rise to the GPA in the first place. To move opposition election victory into state power. The beyond those dilemmas, the West, and the ZANU-PF regime remains unwilling to release EU in particular, must develop the language the levers of state power. Therefore, at this stage and policies of engagement that continue to in Zimbabwe’s history it may be more advisable encourage the implementation of the GPA. to extend the period of power sharing in order While a role for selective sanctions and targeted to prevent a disastrous return to the situation in measures may still be required, the policy drift 2008. must move toward increasing engagement around development assistance. The future of As the situation in Kenya has shown, there are the democratic forces in Zimbabwe depends, definite risks associated with an extended period in important ways, on its capacity to lead of power sharing, including: an economic recovery programme that will • The entrenchment of the more repressive forces strengthen the country’s social base. The in the state assumption that a deepening crisis and • Conflicts between the partners in government as continued sanctions will be advantageous to the a result of dual structures in the state – one falling opposition is a dangerous fallacy. under the President, the other under the Prime CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute) Phone: +47 47 93 80 00 Fax: +47 55 31 03 13 E-mail: cmi@cmi.no P.O.Box 6033, N-5892 Bergen, Norway Visiting address: Jekteviksbakken 31, Bergen Web: www.cmi.no Subscribe to CMIBrief at www.cmi.no Printed version: ISSN 0809-6732 Electronic version: ISSN 0809-6740