Judgment No. CCZ 9/18 Civil Appeal No. CCZ 5/18 Counsel for the applicants argues that s 86 (2) has codified the approach that the court must take in construing a limitation and suggests that the court should look no further. I do not agree. I am inclined towards the broad view expressed by PATEL JA in James v Zimbabwe Electoral Commission and Others 2013 (2) ZLR 659 (CC), wherein at p 666E he held that: “Section 86 (2) of the Constitution is essentially a restatement of the criteria for permissible derogation from constitutional rights as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Nyambirai v National Social Security Authority & Another 1995 (2) ZLR 1 (S))”. In Nyambirai v NSSA (supra), the court, relying on the Canadian case of R v Oakes (1986) 19 CRR 308, had held that: “In effect the court will consider three criteria in determining whether or not a limitation is permissible in the sense of not being shown to be arbitrary or excessive. It will ask itself whether: (i) (ii) (iii) The legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right; The measures designed to meet the legislative objective are rationally connected to it; and The means used impair the right or freedom are no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective.” I read the view by PATEL JA as holding that the provisions of s 86(2) of the Constitution and the general approach to establishing permissible limitations to constitutional rights are complementary and not mutually exclusive and that both are applicable. Thus, the general approach that has been discussed in cases such as In re Mhunumeso and Others 1994 (1) ZLR 49 (S), Nyambirai v NSSA (supra), Retrofit (Private) Limited v PTC and Anor 1995(2) ZLR 199 and Chimakure and Others v AG 2013 (2) ZLR 466 10