Appendix B 73 violence was a grenade attack at the June 23 rally of President Emmerson Mnangagwa in which at least 49 people were injured, including the country’s Vice President, and two people later died from their injuries. The police are still investigating that deplorable incident. To their credit all presidential candidates entered into a well-publicized Peace Pledge. The top two candidates, Emmerson Mnangagwa of ZANU-PF and Nelson Chamisa of MDC-A, sent surrogates on their behalf. All sides managed to avoid large-scale confrontations, although they were not held accountable to the code of conduct for various violations that took place, such as localized intimidation, tearing down of campaign posters, and other infractions. Unfortunately, campaign freedom was significantly offset by: numerous incidents of distributing food and agricultural assistance in politically partisan manners that favored the ruling party (ZANU-PF) and other overt uses of state resources for electoral advantage; partisan activities by some traditional leaders in contravention of constitutional requirements for their political neutrality; and extreme bias in state media, including television and radio (which is the main source by which Zimbabweans get political news). As a consequence, the campaign playing field was unfairly balanced. Digital media was more open than traditional media, though the social media environment was negatively affected by hate speech, including attacks against women candidates for president and other offices, as well as excessive focus on personalities over the substantive issues concerning voters. Voters’ Free Political Choice Universal and equal suffrage is guaranteed under Zimbabwe’s constitution. The relatively free campaigning allowed citizens to make comparisons to past elections and gain information about the choices before them. Voter information campaigns, including assurances of ballot secrecy conducted by the election commission and civil society organizations provided positive messages on voter rights. However, the improvements were likely insufficient to build broad public confidence that voters could make a choice adverse to the ruling establishment without fear of violence or other retribution should the opposition prevail.1 Credible reports to ZIEOM’s long-term observers and reports of various credible citizen groups, including the Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network (ZESN), 2 We the People of Zimbabwe (WTPZ), 3 and others, demonstrated that there were coercive actions around provision of government food and other assistance; so-called “soft-intimidation” (such as reminding citizens in threatening ways of the 2008 violence and its return unless the ruling party wins); lack of widespread publicity campaigns on state radio and other media that the military would accept a ruling party loss; incidents of citizens being coerced into attending ZANU-PF rallies; numerous incidents of ruling party or government officials demanding to see citizens’ voter registration slips and saying that the new voter registration system would allow them to know how the person voted; and incidents of military personnel in civilian clothing conducting politically intimidating activities. Such incidents undermine voters’ free 1 E.g., a reputable public opinion survey by the Afrobarometer just a month before the election indicated that 44 percent of Zimbabwe’s population believed that the country’s security forces would not accept a ruling party loss. Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 223, survey commissioned by the Institute for Justice and Research (South Africa), and field work conducted between June 25 and July 6, 2018. 2 E.g., ZESN Long-Term Observation Report: Issue One; Issue Two; and Issue Three. 3 E.g., WTPZ Brief: Electoral Malpractices Pre Election: May30-24July, 2018, report Date 25 July 2018. 3