On this matter, I noted the importance of ensuring that technological failures do not disenfranchise voters, and a need for contingency mechanisms in case biometric systems malfunction, or if biometric characteristics typically used to identify or verify voters become unavailable (eg loss of finger). The use of BVVS is not usually the case in some countries with limited resources but rather it is an additional mechanism. However printed voters’ registers with photographs or facial images of the voter are now being used in most countries. Furthermore, adequate training on use of ICTs is key to the success of new technologies on elections. I realised that the late introduction of the ICTs with time constraints to pilot testing led to more mistrust of the electoral commission by the stakeholders as they feared technology failure. They were fears that the machines were vote rigging machines used to track the voter’s choice. Civil society and opposition groups urged the electoral commission to ensure there were backup machines in case of malfunctioning or power problems. The greatest lesson for Zimbabwe is for the EMB to build trust and capacity as well as enhancing transparency by engaging key stakeholders at each stage of the voter registration process. If there is no trust of the EMB by stakeholders, introducing ICTs will not improve trust levels and confidence in electoral processes. Despite the late introduction of the BVVS in Uganda, most observers noted that it worked satisfactorily on polling day and also in spite of the early warnings by the some stakeholders about the possibility of technology failure as previously experienced in some countries such as Kenya and Nigeria which employed similar ICTs in the past. The other lesson I learnt is that, biometric voter registration reform goes a long way to ensure that the principle of one man one vote holds and that the machine identify the voter and check that the voter is in the register, but also ensures that the voting status is established thereby preventing duplicate and multiple voting. To a larger extent the investment on BVR paid off in these elections. Having said that, I would reinforce that, BVR is not a silver bullet in solving all electoral issues. The inadequate voter education in Uganda left voters worried whether they required a voter’s card, a national ID, voter location slip or a combination of all documents to be able to vote on election day. However, the commission eventually clarified that its polling officials will have hard copies of the National Voters’ Registers at all polling stations as a final reference to determine who votes or does not. The electronic results transmission and dissemination system (ERTDS) was upgraded whereby the results were electronically managed right from the polling station up to when they were declared at national level. Despite this reform observers complained that the tallying of votes was not done in a transparent manner as aggregated results rather than polling stations ones were being shown. The main opposition leader Kizza Besigye alleged vote rigging and did not accept the results.