13 The strategy, like all effective strategies, was supported by a highly effective marketing campaign: the rhetoric of the Liberation War. As Professor Brian Raftopoulos has put it: The thrust of the attacks was delivered in an anti-imperialist trope that identified internal opposition forces as unpatriotic ‘enemies of the state’, and therefore beyond the pale of the rule of law. Furthermore the attacks sought to justify the denigration of civic and political rights as minority concerns, in the name of a selective articulation of redistributive issues around the land question. 21 The land issue was marketed as a liberation war, or rather the unfinished business of the Liberation War, the so-called “Third Chimurenga”. The enemies were those who held the land, and, coincidentally, these were the “same people” against whom the original war had been fought. The age-old colonial and imperialist powers supported these “enemies”, and the two had now combined to set up a political party - the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) - to drive their interests. This was made real by the clear commitment of some farmers for the MDC. Thus, the struggle was against the old interests, now supported by their “sell out” supporters, evoking the problems of the 1970s and the roles played by other “sell outs” such as Bishop Abel Muzorewa and Ndabaningi Sithole. Thus, a liberation war campaign could be used internally against these “enemies”, and logically the “war veterans” were ideologically equipped to drive this campaign. The violence of the 2000 Parliamentary Election, shocking as it was at the time, was soon eclipsed by the violence that accompanied the 2002 Presidential Elections, 22 but, in the interregnum, substantial efforts were made to resolve the land crisis, with the Abuja Agreement paramount in this process [see above]. Little emerged from the Abuja Agreement, 23 and many observers were amazed at the Zimbabwe government’s rejection of the initiatives of the Commercial Farmers’ Union. These proposals, put forward in 2001, amounted to unconditional surrender by the farmers, but, after many discussions, were rejected by the Zimbabwe government. Cynics saw the rejection as a strategy to keep land on the political and electoral 21 22 23 See Raftopoulos. B. (2003), The State in Crisis: Authoritarian Nationalism, Selective Citizenship, and Distortions of Democracy in Zimbabwe. (p.231), in Hammar, A., Raftopoulos. B., & Jensen, S. (eds), Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis, HARARE: WEAVER PRESS. See Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2002), “Are They Accountable?: Examining alleged violators and their violations pre and post the Presidential Election March 2002”, HARARE: ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS NGO FORUM; Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2002), Human Rights and Zimbabwe’s Presidential Election: March 2002, HARARE: ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS NGO FORUM; Amani (2002), Beating your opposition. Torture during the 2002 Presidential campaign in Zimbabwe, HARARE: AMANI TRUST. See Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2003), Zimbabwe, the Abuja Agreement and Commonwealth Principles: Compliance or Disregard? 8 September 2003, HARARE: ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS NGO FORUM. See also Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2001), Evaluating the Abuja Agreement, HARARE: ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS NGO FORUM; Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2001), Evaluating the Abuja Agreement: Two Months Report, HARARE: ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS NGO FORUM. A Preliminary Report on Human Rights Violations on Commercial Farms, 2000 to 2005.