Amplifying these findings, it can be seen
in Table 3 that the majority of
perpetrators in the violence in Zimbabwe
are non-state actors (51.2%), and
supporters of ZANU-PF, as well as war
veterans. State actors, the police (ZRP),
the army (ZNA), and the intelligence
service (CIO) do also account for a
substantial number of the perpetrators
(22.7%).
Table 3: Frequency of actors against events in
Zimbabwe, 1998 to 2018
[Source: ACLED database]
No. of
% of
events
total
846
14.4
ZRP
97
1.7
Militia
234
4.0
War vets
2607
44.5
ZANU-PF
392
6.7
ZNA
91
1.6
CIO
241
4.1
MDC
666
11.4
Protestors
321
5.5
Rioters
364
6.2
Other
Of course it has to be noted that the period covered by this data base excludes both the
Liberation War and the low-intensity conflict of the 1980s, the violence that took place in
Matabeleland and the Midlands. These were periods in which state actors were dominant as
the perpetrators, but in the former case, the Liberation War, this was in the context of a very
bitter civil war, and there were military casualties as well as gross human rights violations
against civilians. The second period is more complex, and most commentators are agreed that
this was a period characterised by gross human rights violations perpetrated by military
forces of the state.
Table 4 describes the distribution of violent events over the period 1998 to 2018.
Table 4.
Frequency of events by Province in Zimbabwe,
1998 to 2018
[Source: ACLED database]
No. of
% of
Province
events
total
316
5.4
Bulawayo
2310
39.4
Harare
595
10.2
Manicaland
542
9.2
Mashonaland Cent
593
10.1
Mashonaland East
557
9.5
Mashonaland West
309
5.3
Masvingo
120
2.0
Matabeleland North
86
1.5
Matabeleland South
433
7.4
Midlands
The startling finding is the high frequency of
violent events in Harare over the 20 years.
Not even the combined frequencies (28.8%)
of the three Mashonaland Provinces,
anecdotally always seen as the most violent
during elections, approaches the frequency of
violations in Harare. Additionally the
frequency of events in the southern half of
the country- Bulawayo, Matabeleland North
and Matabeleland South – is very low, less
than 9% of the total. However, the traditional
heartland of ZANU-PF support, Manicaland,
the three Mashonaland Provinces, Masvingo
and the Midlands, jointly exceed Harare,
52% as opposed to 39%.
Thus, the empirical evidence over the period 1998 to 2018 supports the claim that Zimbabwe
is a violent country, but it is important to stress that this must be seen in the context of a
prolonged struggle for political power between the two main political parties, ZANU-PF and
MDC-T (previously MDC). The terrain for this struggle was always elections, and, since
1998, Zimbabwe has held 5 elections in 10 years, with yet another to come in 2018.
4