Whither Zimbabwe? Introduction There is a general consensus that the Global Political Agreement (GPA), signed in September 2008 and initiated in February 2009, has not yet lived up to expectations, and has been seriously stalled in the implementation of some of its key components. There are clearly key blockages in the process that are locked into a number of factors, namely Zanu PF’s determination to remain in power at any cost, the MDC’s rightful claim to demand the opening up of democratic spaces promised in the GPA, the limitations of SADC’s capacity to respond to the Zimbabwe crisis, and ambiguities around the Western response of limited economic engagement with the Inclusive Government and continued implementations of targeted sanctions against the Mugabe regime. With fierce positions emerging around this strategic challenge the severe problems facing the GPA place an enormous responsibility on all the key players involved in the Zimbabwe debate, to find a way forward in the current impasse. The central purpose of the Briefing is to consider the options open to the central protagonists in this process, within the context of the balance of power and relations of force within the country and the region, while also contextualising the international dimension. Overview: The Current Context Economic Trends Before turning to the political options available in the current environment there is a need to provide a broad picture of the conditions that have emerged under the GPA. In setting out to resolve “once and for all the current political and economic situations” in the country, the GPA prioritised both “the restoration of economic growth and stability”1 and implementation of political reforms to create the conditions to chart a new political direction for the country. It is important to note that the agreement assumed that all aspects of the GPA would be pursued concurrently, without one aspect of the agreement being implemented as a condition for another. At an economic level the GPA brought some respite to the country. The Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme introduced in 2009, set out to stabilise the economy, and lay the basis for a more transformative mid and long-term economic programme. A major part of this stabilisation programme was the elimination of the Zimbabwean dollar and introduction of a multi currency system. This intervention very quickly eliminated hyperinflation and removed the ability of the Governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe to engage in a series of quasi fiscal activities that had fed the hyper-inflationary spiral since 2004. These quasi fiscal activities included “monetary operations to mop up liquidity, subsidised credit, foreign exchange losses                                                              1  Agreement between the Zimbabwe African National Union‐Patriotic Front (Zanu PF) and the two Movement for  Democratic Change (MDC) Formations, on resolving the challenges facing Zimbabwe, Harare, 15th September, p1.   4