Constitutional Court Mawarire v Mugabe NO & Ors Patel JA for the holding of a general election. This would apply, in particular, where the President dissolves Parliament in terms of s 63(2) well before the expiration of its five year tenure. However, this is subject to s 63(4), so that the automatic dissolution of Parliament by operation of law may but need not take effect on the day preceding the day fixed for the holding of elections. In other words, the prescribed tenure of Parliament cannot be extended beyond five years in the event that the date fixed for elections falls outside that period. In that case, the dissolution of Parliament cannot immediately precede the election date fixed under s 58(1). Reading all of the relevant provisions together, the relationship between the holding of elections and the life of Parliament is resolved as follows. Where Parliament is dissolved by the President acting under s 63(2), elections must be held within four months after the issue of the proclamation dissolving it in terms of s 63(7). In this case, the two events must be synchronised so that the dissolution of Parliament takes effect on the day preceding the day or days fixed for elections in terms of s 58(1). Conversely, where Parliament is dissolved by operation of law after the effluxion of five years in terms of s 63(4), elections must be held within a period not exceeding four months after the dissolution of Parliament. In this case, elections need not be held immediately after such dissolution, so long as they are held on a day or days within the four month period after dissolution. In short, different time frames apply to the two forms of dissolution. Does this differentiation necessarily entail an absurdity? I am inclined to think not. Where the President takes a deliberate decision, for whatever reason of political or practical expediency, to dissolve Parliament before the expiry of its prescribed five year tenure, that decision involves the exercise of an extraordinary executive power. And in that extraordinary eventuality, Parliament has deemed it fit to ensure that there should not be any delay between its dissolution and the holding of general elections. However, the need for such urgency or immediacy does not arise where Parliament continues in existence and operation throughout its ordinary term of five years. Of course, it is a matter of concern that the plain reading of s 58(1) invites the "spectre" of rule by Executive decree for a maximum period of four months without the restraint of Parliamentary oversight. While the possibility of this hiatus may be undesirable from a democratic perspective, it is not necessarily absurd or unconstitutional. That scenario, unpalatable as it may be, is explicitly contemplated in s 31E of the Constitution dealing with the tenure of office of members of the Executive. More specifically, s 31E (2) provides that: "No person shall hold office as Vice-President, Minister or Deputy Minister for longer than three months unless he is a member of Parliament: Provided that if during that period Parliament is dissolved, he may continue to hold such office without being a member of Parliament until Parliament first meets after the dissolution." This provision was substituted by Parliament through Act No. 31 of 1989, in tandem with the advent of the executive presidency. It constitutes a clear recognition and acceptance by Parliament itself of the possibility of its abeyance for the duration of at least three months. In effect, it unequivocally fortifies the plain and unqualified construction of s 58(1) vis-a-vis the provisions of subss 63 (4) and (7). For all of the aforestated reasons, I would dismiss the present application on its merits., 23