Judgment No. CCZ 9/14 12 Const. Application No. CCZ 276/12 In my view, the events that intervened between the period when the applicants were first charged and the eventual setting down of the matter for trial would serve to afford an acceptable explanation for the inordinate delay. The question that is before this Court is whether the explanation can lead to the conclusion that such delay in the circumstances of the case cannot be regarded as unreasonable. The test for determining whether there has been an unreasonable delay or not requires an objective analysis of all the factors surrounding the entire process, including any challenges and problems that the prosecuting authority might have been faced with during the relevant period. The attitude and actions of the accused persons are also a consideration in the assessment. In Mlambo’s case (supra) GUBBAY CJ stated: “The distinction between what is a reasonable period and what is not cannot be drawn too sharply. Undoubtedly it will be difficult in some cases to decide whether the lapse of time in affording an accused a fair hearing of his case has passed the reasonable mark or not. It is a question of degree. All the circumstances have to be considered in making what is essentially a value judgment. However, I believe that the experience of judicial officers enables them to determine on which side of the line the position of a particular accused falls.” Remarks to the same effect were made by KRIEGLER J in Sanderson v Attorney-General, Eastern Cape 1998 (1) SACR 227 (CC) at 242a-c wherein he stated: “The test for reasonableness whether the time allowed to lapse was reasonable should not be unduly stratified or pre-ordained. In some jurisdictions, prejudice is presumedsometimes irrebuttably-after the lapse of loosely specified time periods. I do not believe it would be helpful for our courts to impose semi-formal time constraints on the prosecuting authority. That would be a law making function which it would be inappropriate for the court to exercise. The courts will apply their experience of how the lapse of time generally affects the liberty, security and pre-trial interests that concern us. Of the three forms of prejudice, the pre-trial related variety is possibly the hardest to establish, here as in the case of other forms of prejudice, trial courts will have to draw sensible inferences from the evidence. By and large, it seems a fair although tentative generalisation that the lapse of time heightens the various kinds of prejudice that s25 (3((a) seeks to diminish.”