Judgment No. CCZ 9/2016 11 Const. Application No. CCZ 316/2012 The general principle is that a tax is the obligation or burden (debt) to pay a specific amount of money to a designated agent imposed (levied) on a person by the State, in the exercise of the constitutional power of taxation. The obligation is imposed in relation to or by reference to an activity in respect of property selected in the exercise of a wide discretion as the subject of taxation. The obligation for the payment of the tax is imposed by the State in terms of a law of general application on the public or a substantial section of the public to raise money for a public purpose. The primary meaning of taxation is, therefore, raising money for the purposes of government by means of compulsory contributions from individual persons. A tax is not a tax merely because the word “tax” is used to describe the obligation to be paid for a public purpose. The word “tax” is a generic term or “genus” covering a variety of species of obligations to pay money for public purposes. An obligation of the same cannot be excluded from proper classification because of the name by which it is called. In other words the fact that the fixed amount of money compulsorily payable by members of the public who possess receivers is called a “licence fee” would not alter the fact of its being a “tax”. The term “licence fee” is not a definition but is a conclusion. It is a label describing a debt imposed on a person by a statute in respect of an activity in relation to property. There are many kinds of taxes that may be imposed by the State in the exercise of the power of taxation. In the American case of Hylton v United States 3 Dall 171 (Supreme.justice.com) it was held that the term “taxation” covers every conceivable exaction