iv) Limited tenure of office for Commissioners Section 3(1) of the NPRC Bill states that a member of the Commission shall be appointed for a term of 5 years upon which the President has powers to terminate or renew. The provisions in the Bill are unconstitutional in this regard. HZT believes that tenure of office for commissioners must be guided by the constitution as is the case with the appointment of judges as provided under the Constitution 237(3) of the Constitution. Section 237 (3) of the constitution already sets out the procedure of Commissioners removal as that judge removal. In addition, Section 237(2a-d) states the reasons causing removal of Commissioners. Therefore, the constitution must be followed in this regard. Furthermore, given the 10 year life span of the Commission itself and the task at hand, appointing commissioners once will improve efficacy and ensure continuity in fulfilling the NPRC mandate. The NPRC cannot be inundated with appointment and disappointment of Commissioners or any staff at the expense of fulfilling its mandate. v) Limited powers of the Commission. Section 9(1) of the Bill notes that the NPRC will report to the Minister and give recommendations on its findings after investigations. However, in the constitution section 235 is clear that the NPRC is accountable to Parliament. The NPRC like any commission will submit its report to Parliament through minister responsible not to the minister responsible under section 323 (1) of the Constitution. These differences point to a divergence from the constitutional provisions enunciating where the Commission’s accountability lies. It dilutes the powers of the NPRC by placing it under the direct control of the responsible Minister. This situation is unacceptable both at law and in practice. The NPRC cannot carry out investigations and then give their recommendations to a political appointee in the Executive when there are other bodies such as the Police and the Prosecutor General who can expedite the recommendations if they have to deal with justice delivery faster and more efficiently. Where there are other recommendations concerning other pillars of transitional justice the recommendations can be directed to specific offices and the responsible Minister kept duly informed. Furthermore, a closer look to the Bill shows that the Minister’s powers are gradually increasing as the Bill unravels. First he is able to appoint staffers of his choice to the Secretariat, he can issue certificates barring investigations and now in this clause he has to be given recommendations which he/she according to section 9 (2b) of the Bill “shall deal with in any manner that the Minister deems necessary in the circumstances”. Such open and ambiguous statements add to the further entrenchment of the Ministers’ powers in placating the work of the NPRC. The powers conferred to the Minister in Clause 9 gives the Commission the responsibilities of investigations and making recommendations to the Minister only which is contrary to functions of the Commission stipulated in Section 252 of the constitution. HZT recommends that the reporting and accountability procedure for the NPRC be laid out clearly and consistent with the Constitution such that the NPRC does not have to report directly to the Minister. The Minister should be able to get reports from the NPRC and pass them on or act on them without alterations. The fact that the 12