46 Judgment No. CCZ 2/18 Constitutional Application No. CCZ 86/15 There is a distinction between compulsory deprivation and compulsory acquisition of private property by the State. Deprivation does not necessarily amount to acquisition or taking away of property by the State. It may be confined to the imposition of restrictions on the use, enjoyment or exploitation of the private property. In that case, deprivation must be by a law of general application and be for the purpose of one of the public interests listed in s 73(1)(b) of the Constitution. Where the compulsory deprivation involves the acquisition or taking away or dispossession of private property, there is expropriation. It cannot be disputed that acquisition means and implies the acquiring of the entire title of the expropriated owner, whatever the nature or extent of that title might be. The whole bundle of rights which were vested in the original holder would pass on acquisition to the acquirer, leaving nothing in the former. Expropriation requires the payment of a fair and adequate compensation. In that case, all the requirements of validity of the law prescribed under s 71(3) of the Constitution must be met. Whichever way one looks at the facts of this case, s 71(3) of the Constitution is not applicable, whether in the broad sense of compulsory deprivation or the narrow meaning of expropriation. There was no retrospective compulsory deprivation of vested rights in property. The retrospective imposition of the financial obligation on employers who terminated their employees’ contracts on notice to pay them the minimum retrenchment package as compensation for loss of employment cannot be passed as compulsory deprivation of employers of private property in the