Judgment No. SC 15/18 Civil Appeal No. SC 266/15 The appellant’s case was that without the respondent producing a written cancellation of the agreement as required in clause 5 of the Deed of suretyship signed by the respondent, the deed of suretyship still bound the respondent thus the court a quo erred in dismissing its claim against him. Clause 5 of the deed of suretyship reads as follows: “The Surety shall remain in full force as a continuing security, notwithstanding an intermediate settlement or fluctuations in the amounts outstanding from time to time by the Debtor in terms of the contract in place, notwithstanding the death or legal disability of me, until the said ZFC Limited has agreed in writing to cancel this suretyship and the suretyship shall further remain in force as a continuing security, binding upon me, notwithstanding that it may on any ground in whole or in part have ceased to be binding on me.” On the basis of this clause the appellant argued that it did not cancel the deed of surety in writing and thus the respondent remained indebted. It relied on the case of Muchabaiwa v Grab Enterprises (Pvt) Ltd 1996 (2) ZLR 691 (SC) in which KORSAH JA stated: “The general principle which applies to contracts, and commonly designated as caveat subscriptor, is that a party to the contract is bound by his signature, whether or not he has read or understood the contract, or the contract was signed with blank spaces later to be filled in. Expatiating on this principle in National and Grindlays Bank v Yelverton 1972 (1) RLR 365 (G) at 367; 1972 (4) SA 114 (R) at 116G-H, DAVIES J cited with approval, the following statement by INNES CJ in Burger v Central South Africa Railways 1903 TS 571 and 578 (decided before the promulgation of s 6 of the General Laws Amendment Act): “It is a sound principle of law that a man, when he signs a contract, is taken to be bound by the ordinary meaning and effects of the words which appear over his signature.”” This authority highlights the principle that the signatory to an agreement is bound by the impression of assent created by his or her signature in the mind of the contract enforcer. The appellant therefore averred that the parties were bound by clause 5 and that the deed of suretyship should have been cancelled in writing by the appellant in order to absolve the respondent from liability. 5