powers. It is not entirely clear why there was a need to provide for the creation of
an OAC under the law. It would have been sufficient, to preserve the
independence of the Commission, to merely require it to have the power to
accredit election observers. The Commission would then have used its internal
systems to create a committee. Creating the OAC under the law is tantamount to
micromanaging the ZEC. On a point of principle, the ZEC as the electoral body
should be left to create its own institutional mechanisms for among other things,
election observation. As it is, this committee (OAC) that has been created is likely
to compete rather than complement the ZEC particularly when one considers the
composition of the OAC which is heavily political.
The composition of the OAC is that 3 members (including the Chairperson) are
from the ZEC but a further four are essentially direct political nominees - one
person is nominated by the Office of the President and Cabinet; one person is
nominated by the Minister of Justice; one person nominated by the Minster
responsible for Foreign Affairs and one person nominated by the Minster
responsible for Immigration (Home Affairs). If the original aim was to reduce
political interference in the accreditation process, this is not fully achieved given
that political nominees from outside the Commission dominate the OAC.
Further, there is an apparent anomaly in the appointment process which is
pertinent in the current political climate. It is that under the Inclusive
Government arrangements, ministerial portfolios are distributed among the three
main political parties. If one party holds all or most of the ministerial portfolios
that have a role in the nomination of members to the accreditation committee,
this will likely give that party an unfair advantage over others. In addition to the
nominee of the President’s Office, the other nominees are from ministries that are
controlled by ZANU PF. The MDC-T only has partial influence over the Ministry of
Home Affairs which controls immigration as this portfolio is currently shared
between ZANU PF and the MDC-T. The other MDC has none. It is clear therefore
that in practical terms, the OAC will be dominated by nominees of one political
party which will also be a contestant in the elections.
•
In these circumstances, ZESN recommends that the power to
accredit election observers should be vested solely in the ZEC so
that parties who could potentially be contestants in elections have
no role whatsoever as this would create an unlevel playing field.
•
Alternatively, if there should be nominations from outside the
Commission, this power should be vested in the Parliamentary
Committee on Standing Rules and Orders which has equitable
representation
between
political
parties
represented
in
Parliament.
•
It is also recommended that the OAC be expanded to include
representatives of civil society organisations, religious groups and
the professions.
2