rejected applicants. There is a risk that if it is only a list of successful applicants, the ZEC will not have the chance to consider whether the rejectionss were justified. • It is recommended that there be clarity that the OAC will forward to the ZEC all applications – whether successful or rejected, together with reasons for the decision in each case, especially where there has been a rejection. • It is further recommended that in line with the Constitution and principles of natural justice, the right of rejected applicants must be protected so that the ZEC has a facility to enable each reject to challenge the recommendation of the OAC. • It must also be made clear under the law that the OAC must provide full and sufficient reasons for their decision to enable the applicant to understand why it has been rejected and to make a case for appeal if need be. The ZEC must also give the applicant adequate time to challenge the decision. Overall it is useful that the Commission is now at the centre of the election observer selection process. However there are still critical weaknesses, identified in this analysis. In particular, ZESN makes the following recommendations: • The power to accredit election observers must be vested solely in the ZEC; • To minimise political interference in the handling of the election process, ministers and all potential election contestants must have no role whatsoever in the accreditation of election observers; • Should there be any justifiable reason for nominating members of the accrediting committee by persons outside the ZEC, this power should be vested in the Parliamentary Committee on Standing Rules and Orders which has equitable representation between political parties represented in Parliament; • If Ministerial nominees are retained, the OAC should also be expanded to include representatives of civil society organisations, religious groups and the professions. • The Commission must have exclusive powers to invite applications from potential observers, local or foreign; • There is no need to create a separate legal entity in the form of the OAC, rather, the Commission must be left to devise its own decision-making process and create its own committees for this purpose; 4