Zi m ba bw e’s CONST I TUT I O na l REFORM pr o ce ss led to the suspension of 13 scheduled meetings in September 2010. All this undermined prospects for producing a legitimate draft constitution that represents the will of the people. Meanwhile, hardliners in ZANU-PF blocked attempted discussion of the contentious issue of security sector reform. Given the sector’s violent and partisan involvement in influencing the outcome of previous polls, reforms are widely seen as essential if free and fair elections are to take place. Notwithstanding this, the fact that the security sector was not included in the 17 themes discussed during the public outreach process may have placated this powerful faction, and prevented it from derailing the entire constitution-making process and its possible outcome. Three principal drafters – Justice Moses Chinhengo with constitutional experts, Priscilla Madzonga and Brian Crozier – led the drafting committee. In a move that demonstrated that the constitutional-review process was drawing lessons from comparative African experiences such as that of South Africa, the draft constitution is based on a list of agreed constitutional issues drawn from a national report of people’s submissions. The chief drafters were assisted by 17 constitutional experts – five from each of the three governing parties and two from the council of traditional chiefs. COPAC also enlisted the services of South African constitutional law and constitution-making expert, Hassen Ebrahim, who brought to the process his experience of constitution drafting in South Africa, Nepal, Somalia and Uganda. Some civil society organisations, including the NCA, which ironically boycotted the COPAC process, expressed their dismay at being excluded from the drafting phase that has been ongoing since December 2011, arguing that this undermined the representativeness and transparency of the process. Other critics have also argued that opting to have a small drafting committee undermined public participation and deliberation at the critical constitution-writing stage. However, it is possible that, by precluding the need to constantly bargain and compromise to accommodate numerous divergent interests, the small number of drafters can more productively manage logistical challenges, and thus facilitate a more efficient production of a coherent constitutional document. Unfortunately, the parties represented in the inclusive government, just as they had done during the preceding public outreach programme, turned the drafting process into yet another battleground. The deeply polarised political environment, characterised by mistrust between ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations, dominated the process. Critics have charged that the parties are bent on manipulating the constitution-writing process to ensure the incorporation of their positions and interests at the expense of reflecting the will of the people. Indeed, after the production of the preliminary drafts of the first four chapters of the constitution, ZANU-PF unilaterally attempted to stop the drafting process and accused the drafters of siding with the MDC by allegedly importing items not raised during the public outreach process.6 There remained concern that the process would fall victim to partisan capture, with political parties ‘smuggling in’ points that were not covered during the outreach phase.7 The result could be a draft constitution which is acceptable to the entrenched political powers and interests but lacks wider public support. As Bruce Ackerman (2000: 633, 673) rightly argues, ‘A workable constitution is worthless unless [the framers] can get it accepted.’ The constitution-drafting process, already once re-scheduled for completion by January 2012, is running behind schedule. Problems so far have included: disruption of COPAC activities by war veterans allied to ZANU-PF who accuse COPAC officials of slowing down the process and manipulating it by ignoring views expressed during the outreach process; leakage of documents to state media allegedly by ZANU-PF members of COPAC intended to put pressure on drafters to change certain positions; and military interference – the army chief regularly summonses the ZANU-PF component of COPAC for briefings, thereby aggravating suspicions and divisions within the committee as a whole.8 7