Zi m ba bw e’s CONST I TUT I O na l REFORM pr o ce ss popular movement for a ‘people-driven’ constitutional-reform process, President Mugabe established the Constitutional Commission, ‘apparently with the intention of maintaining control over both the review process and the contents of the new constitution’ (Hatchard 2001: 210). He used his powers under the Commissions of Inquiry Act to determine the size and composition of the commission. In addition, the commission’s mandate was limited to submitting recommendations for a new constitution to the president on or before 30 November 1999, which he was under no legal obligation to accept (Hatchard 2001). The composition of the commission further betrayed the president’s intention to steer the constitutional-reform process; in fact ZANU-PF monopolised the commission’s work from the start. It was chaired by high-court judge Godfrey Chidyausiku, who was seen as a close ally of the president (a suspicion confirmed by his appointment as judge president and subsequently as chief justice in 2001). In addition, while the government invited members from a cross-section of society in an effort to give the commission a semblance of being fully representative, the majority of the commission’s 400 members were ZANU-PF members or supporters – for example, all 150 members of parliament were included (of which only three belonged to other political parties). Although some reputable academics and civil society activists agreed to ‘work from within’ in an attempt to influence the commission’s performance, others associated with the NCA refused to participate in what they perceived to be a fundamentally flawed process (Hatchard 2001). The president gave the Constitutional Commission a tight schedule to produce a new draft constitution, increasing fears that he was ‘intent on pushing his own constitutional and political agenda’ (Hatchard 2001: 213). Not surprisingly, these procedural choices severely undermined the legitimacy of the final draft. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Commission embarked on a nationwide outreach programme to gather the views of the people. This commendable and extensive consultation process, guided by the much-publicised List of Constitutional Issues and Questions, offered Zimbabwean citizens an opportunity to openly discuss and debate the proposed constitution (Mandaza 2012). The Commission said it organised 4  321 public meetings which were attended by a total of 556  276 individuals, and 700 special ad hoc meetings attended by at total of 150  000 people. In addition, the commission received 4  000 written submissions, and aired 31 programmes on ZBC TV as well as 143 programmes on Zimbabwe’s four public radio stations: 16 programmes on Radio 1 (English); 55 programmes on Radio 2 (Shona and Ndebele); 2 programmes on Radio 3 (English); and 70 programmes on Radio 4 (minority languages such as Tonga and Venda) (Dorman 2003: 852). Externally, Zimbabweans in South Africa and the United Kingdom were also consulted. Significantly, while the Constitutional Commission stressed the deficiencies of the Lancaster House Constitution, participants in the public outreach phase stressed that they were more concerned about the 1987 constitutional amendments, which entrenched the powers of the executive presidency, and linked the constitution to the country’s growing political and economic crisis (Dorman 2003). In addition to undertaking a ‘scientific’ survey to further strengthen its findings on specific issues, the commission convened an international conference that brought together constitutional scholars and experts able to offer useful lessons from elsewhere (Mandaza 2012). The Constitutional Commission managed to complete all these processes and submitted a draft constitution to President Mugabe on 29 November 1999, within its stipulated fivemonth time frame. Ibbo Mandaza indicated that the audited cost of the process amounted to US$7 280 652 (Mandaza 2012) and, as chair of the Constitutional Commission’s administrative and finance subcommittee, it is perhaps not surprising that he believes the Commission’s model and process stands out as the best of Zimbabwe’s constitution-making endeavours (Mandaza 2012). Predictably, however, the Constitutional Commission’s draft retained the executive presidency’s dominant role, although it did suggest limiting a president to two five-year terms in office. While it introduced the office of a prime minister, it still allocated to the president 3