"The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part of the body." and "The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion was committed against a person incapable of giving genuine consent‟‟. The concept of “invasion” is intended to be broad enough to be gender-neutral. The international definition is understood to include situations where the victim may be incapable of giving genuine 25 consent if affected by natural, induced or age-related incapacity. Prior to the Akayesu judgment of the ICTR, there was no commonly accepted definition of rape or sexual violence in international law. The definition given to these terms in the Akayesu case described rape as, „… a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive.” And sexual violence which constitutes rape as „…any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive…not limited to physical invasion of the human body and may include acts which do not involve penetration or even physical contact.” 26 Prior to Akayesu and Kunarac , rape was a reprehensible, vicious, and inhumane act, but it was not an explicitly recognized as a crime against humanity within international law. Rape was clearly a violation of the Geneva Conventions, and it was also generally recognized as a war crime under international law. However, rape has been viewed by the international community as a product of war, and, as such, has seldom been prosecuted. The definition of rape advanced by the ICTR was adopted by the ICTY in the Prosecutor v Delalic 27 (Celibici) , where the trial chamber stated that, „ it was in agreement with the ICTR‟s reasoning, and saw no reason to depart from the conclusion of the ICTR in the Akayesu judgment on this issue. Thus the trial chamber considered also rape to constitute a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances that are coercive.‟28 The trial chamber highlighted that „ Rape and other forms of sexual assault are prohibited by a number of international humanitarian instruments. Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention specially prohibits rape, any form of indecent assault and the enforced prostitution of women. This prohibition is also found in article 4(2) of additional Protocol II, in internal armed conflict. Article 76(1) of additional protocol I expressly requires that women be protected from rape, forced prostitution and any other form of indecent assault. This prohibition is implicitly found in Article 46 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) that provides for the protection of family honour and rights. In the Nuremberg charter, rape is prohibited as a crime against humanity under Article 6(c). ‟ 29 The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva Convention IV) was concluded in 1949, and entered into force on October 21, 1950. As its title implies, the convention governs the treatment of civilians during times of war. In the relevant part, it asserts that “[w]omen shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault .” Thus, for the first time in 25 26 27 28 29 Prosecutor v Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T. See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Judgment, and Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T IT-96-21-T, para 479. www.icty.org/cases (Accessed10 October 2010) IT-96-21-T, para 479. www.icty.org/cases (Accessed10 Ocotber 2010) IT-96-21-T, para 475-476.