humiliate, dominate, and instil fear in victims, their families, and communities during armed conflict”.209 In the Furundzija judgment, the ICTY Trial Chamber affirmed that “international criminal rules punish not only rape but also any serious sexual assault falling short of actual penetration. It would seem that the prohibition embraces all serious abuses of a sexual nature inflicted upon the physical and moral integrity of a person by means of coercion, threat of force or intimidation in a way that is degrading and humiliating for the victim's dignity”.210 ii) No Consent under Coercive Circumstances The SCSL Trial Chamber in the RUF case adopted an assumption of non-consent to rape when circumstances are coercive. With respect to the invasion of Freetown in 1999, it stated that “an atmosphere of extreme violence prevailed during the attack on the Freetown peninsula, noting the lootings, burnings, amputations and killings that occurred simultaneously”, creating circumstances in which “the individuals who were forced to have intercourse were incapable of genuine consent”.211 Despite the fact that, unlike the definition of rape, the definitions of sexual slavery and forced marriage do not contain element of proving non-consent, 212 the Trial Chamber nevertheless used a similar analysis to find that genuine consent to sexual slavery and forced marriage was not possible, given the context of a hostile and coercive war environment. 213 The Rwanda Tribunal in the Akayesu judgment noted that the presence of coercive circumstances implies non-consent. It noted that “coercive circumstances need not be evidenced by a show of physical force. Threats, intimidation, extortion and other forms of duress which prey on fear or desperation may constitute coercion, and coercion may be inherent in certain circumstances, such as armed conflict or the military presence…”.214 iii) Defining Rape and Sexual Violence The Akayesu judgment held that sexual violence is “not limited to physical invasion of the human body and may include acts which do not involve penetration or even physical contact”. 215 The judgment went on to assert that sexual violence falls within the scope of “other inhumane acts”, “outrages upon personal dignity”, and “serious bodily or mental harm” provisions of the ICTR statute, and since those provisions are the same as the Geneva Conventions, sexual violence falls within the scope of these acts where listed as such. In the judgment, the ICTR defined rape “as a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive”. The ICTY, in the Furundzija judgment216 surveyed the national laws on the crime of rape to arrive at a definition. It held that rape involves penetration, however slight, along with an element of force. It expanded the definition to include forced oral penetration and penetration by objects. The Furundzija definition of rape reads:217 “The sexual penetration, however slight: 209 Ibid., ¶ 156. 210 The Prosecutor v Furundzija, ICTY, Trial Chamber judgment Case No. IT-95-17/1, Dec.10, 1998 ¶ 186. 211 The Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber I, Mar. 2, 2009), available at www.sc- sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=D5HojR8FZS4%3d&tabid=215, ¶ 1577. 212 Ibid, ¶¶ 145 (elements of rape), 158 (elements of sexual slavery), 168 (elements of inhumane acts); AFRC TJ, ¶¶ 693 (elements of rape), 708 (elements of sexual slavery), 698 (elements of inhumane acts). 213 Ibid., ¶¶ 1466, 1470–72, 1581. Inherent within the very concept of slavery is the negation of consent. 214 The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR Trial Chamber Judgment, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998, ¶ 688. 215 Ibid., ¶ 688. 216 The Prosecutor v Furundzija, ICTY, Trial Chamber judgment Case No. IT-95-17/1, Dec.10, 1998 ¶ 186. 217 Ibid., ¶ 185. REDRESS | 6. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AND CRIMINAL LAW 59