trial judgment also noted that payment or exchange is not required to establish the exercise of ownership,224 nor does ownership require confinement to a particular place. 225 These judgments, along with the ECOWAS judgment on slavery (discussed in Section 4 above) help to consolidate international criminal law jurisprudence with respect to the recently codified prohibited act of sexual slavery. v) Rape as Torture Several judgments of the ad hoc tribunals have compared rape to torture and found in rape the elements required to prove torture. In the Delalic (“Celebici”) judgment, the ICTY Trial Chamber stated, The condemnation and punishment of rape becomes all the more urgent where it is committed by, or at the instigation of, a public official, or with the consent or acquiescence of such an official. Rape causes severe pain and suffering, both physical and psychological. The psychological suffering of persons upon whom rape is inflicted may be exacerbated by social and cultural conditions and can be particularly acute and long lasting. Furthermore, it is difficult to envisage circumstances in which rape, by, or at the instigation of a public official, or with the consent or acquiescence of an official, could be considered as occurring for a purpose that does not, in some way, involve punishment, coercion, discrimination or intimidation… Accordingly, whenever rape and other forms of sexual violence meet the aforementioned criteria, then they shall constitute torture, in the same manner as any other acts that meet these criteria.226 Another Trial Chamber at the ICTY followed suit in the Furundzija judgment affirming the existence of purpose element of torture in the act of rape. It states, “[r]ape is resorted to either by the interrogator himself or by other persons associated with the interrogation of a detainee, as a means of punishing, intimidating, coercing or humiliating the victim, or obtaining information, or a confession, from the victim or a third person”.227 The Trial Chamber at the ICTR in the Akayesu case held similarly, stating, “[l]ike torture, rape is used for such purposes as intimidation, degradation, humiliation, discrimination, punishment, control or destruction of a person. Like torture, rape is a violation of personal dignity, and rape in fact constitutes torture when inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or others person acting in an official capacity”.228 Note however, that in the Kunarac decision, the Yugoslav Tribunal was faced directly with the question of whether the public official requirement was part of the customary international law prohibition of torture, and determined that it was not. According to the Appeal Chambers, although the Trial Chamber was right in the Furundzija judgment to note that the definition of torture provided in the Torture Convention “reflected customary international law” in relation to the responsibility of States, this did not mean that “this definition wholly reflects customary international law regarding the meaning of the crime of torture generally”. It found that the Trial Chamber in the Kunarac case was therefore right to take “the position that the public official requirement is not a requirement under customary international law in relation to the criminal responsibility of an individual for torture outside of the framework of the Torture Convention”.229 These judgments have established beyond doubt that rape in the context of wars and conflict, whether or not committed by a State official, may constitute torture. Consequently, it has 224 Ibid. 225 Ibid. 226 The Prosecutor v. Delalic, ICTY, Trial Chamber judgment Case No. IT-96-21-T Nov. 16, 1998 ¶ 496. 227 The Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber I, Mar. 2, 2009), available at http://www.sc- sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=D5HojR8FZS4%3d&tabid=215 (hereinafter the RUF TJ) at ¶ 163. 228 The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR Trial Chamber Judgment, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998, ¶ 597. 229 The Prosecutor v. Kunarac and others, ICTY, IT-96-23-A & IT-96-23/1-A, 12 June 2002, paras. 146-148. REDRESS | 6. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AND CRIMINAL LAW 61