DISTRIBUTED BY VERITAS TRUST Tel: [263] [4] 794478 Fax & Messages [263] [4] 793592 E-mail: veritas@mango.zw Veritas makes every effort to ensure the provision of reliable information, but cannot take legal responsibility for information supplied. Judgment No. SC 36/18 Civil Appeal No. SC 279/16 In his book, the Law of Property, the learned author, H Silberberg, states that as a general rule a possessor who alleges that he has been ‘despoiled’ must act immediately and before third parties have acquired a right or proprietary interest in the property in respect of which a spoliation order is sought. In Manga v Manga (supra), this Court also had occasion to consider the question of what constituted delay in the bringing of the application and whether such would affect the grant of a remedy under the mandament van spolie. GUBBAY CJ said: “Finally, it was urged on the respondent’s behalf that this court should decline to interfere with the judgment of the court a quo, on the ground that the appellant had failed to seek a spoliation order within a reasonable time after the date of dispossession, albeit the lodging of the application, on 10 July 1989, had been preceded by numerous demands of the property. A similar argument was presented to STEYN J in Jivan v National Housing Commission 1977(3) SA 890(W). He considered that the bar of one year, which under the common law is imposed in the case of the mandament van complainte, should be a guide to modern practice as regards the mandament van spolie, but that the court was not necessarily bound to refuse an order sought after a year or allow an order if less than a full year had elapsed, especially if, on account of the delay, no relief of any practical value could be granted.” In this case, the appellant only launched the application on 15 May 2015, after a period of almost eleven months had elapsed. Prior to that he had addressed a letter to the Zimbabwe Republic Police, demanding return of the vehicles. The letter in question was dated 18 November 2014 and was written by his legal practitioners. Critically, the letter makes no mention that the appellant was unlawfully dispossessed of the vehicles in question, the suggestion being made that he was made to surrender them. It becomes necessary to quote the paragraph detailing the claim for the recovery of the vehicles as alleged by the appellant in the letter in question: 9