DISTRIBUTED BY VERITAS TRUST Tel: [263] [4] 794478 Fax & Messages [263] [4] 793592 E-mail: veritas@mango.zw Veritas makes every effort to ensure the provision of reliable information, but cannot take legal responsibility for information supplied. Judgment No. SC 36/18 Civil Appeal No. SC 279/16 The court a quo found that from the manner in which the respondent regained possession of the motor vehicles, one could not impugn the lawfulness thereof. The learned judge in the court a quo found that the appellant had been allocated the motor vehicles as part of his conditions of service and that at the time that the vehicles were repossessed no contract was in existence. The court also found that the appellant had executed and signed a form of indemnity, which was handwritten and signed by the appellant. It was witnessed by Majachani and one Tichawona. The learned judge a quo concluded that from the totality of the evidence as set out in the papers the appellant would appear to have handed over the vehicles willingly given the employer employee relationship that had existed and which had been the basis upon which the appellant had originally acquired possession of the vehicles in question. The court also found that the delay by the appellant in bringing the application, viewed in conjunction with the surrender of the vehicles in the absence of a court order could be read as acquiescence to the dispossession. In coming to the conclusion that it arrived at, the court a quo was guided by the dicta in Jivan v National Housing Commission 1977(3) SA 890, and followed in Manga v Manga 1991(2) ZLR 251(S), by this Court. A useful passage relating to the question of delay in bringing an application for spoliatory relief is found in Jivan v National Housing Commission (supra). At 893A-H, STEYN J states: “In my view the court has a discretion to refuse an application where on account of the delay in bringing it, no relief of any practical value can be granted at the time of the hearing of such application. In exercising this discretion I think the bar imposed after one year in respect of the mandament consequential upon complainte is a guide to modern practice. If an applicant delayed for more than a year before bringing his application for mandament of spolie, there would have to be special considerations present to allow such applicant to proceed with his 7