communities who would report every occurrence to ZANU-PF members. In Mberengwa another politically restive area in the Midlands province, the research team covered Chief Mataruse’s area, one of the respondents thought the research team was from the feared CIO and thus demanded identification and upon being shown the MPOI identity card, went on to demand the national ID. In Chimanimani ward 7, the research team was approached by overzealous female war veterans who demanded to know the purpose of the team’s visit in that area. In Chidodo and Mudzengerere communities of Guruve (Mashonaland Central province), the research assistants were told to seek the permission of the traditional leaders …’ Political context into the present Come the month of February 2011 evidence started mounting of ZANU-PF youth militia activities, centred in Mbare. It started with the ZANU-PF attacking MDC youth in their offices. Then, just outside of Harare, gangs attempted to take resorts and a bird sanctuary around Lake Chivero. Incidents spread as far away as Mutare. By the middle of the month the MDC-T stated that more than 1 000 of its members had been displaced. Independent humanitarian aid organisations supported such numbers with evidence of homes destroyed in Epworth and Bindura. In mid-February 2011 Tsvangirai said ‘either the Commander-In-Chief is aware of [the youth violence] or there is now a Third Force that has assumed control in this country without the mandate of the people’.2 Violence was reported as ZANU-PF was building support for its petition against ‘sanctions’, with two million targeted to sign. Observers suggested that the militia campaign, Operation Ngatizivane (‘Let's get to know one another’) indicated the beginning of ZANU-PF’s election and/or constitutional referendum campaign.3 In the wake of battles with MDC youth in Mbare and the arrest and effective disappearance of MDC MP Douglas Mwonzora, the chair of the parliamentary constitution drafting committee, predictions were that the violence could approach the level of June 2008. This time, however, a parliamentary committee was called to investigate and Police Commissioner Augustine Chihuri was summoned to testify. Constitution-making and elections In December, the COPAC public meetings on the constitutional dispensation had come to a close and preparations for the referendum on the constitution were beginning. According to the GPA, the constitutional referendum must be complete before an election can be called, often anticipated for September 2011. The principals to the GPA – the leaders of ZANU-PF, MDC-T and MDC-M – should agree to call an election, but if they cannot agree (and the early 2011 splits in the MDC-M could mean that, without a president, the MDC-M may not have a voice in the process, so the process would be unconstitutional) the Zimbabwean president can go ahead and call one. ZANU-PF’s strategy remained uncertain – but was crucial because of the apparent powers of President Mugabe (and his stated intention) to call elections when he so wishes. 2 Peta Thornycroft, ‘Rising Political Violence Reported in Zimbabwe’, VOANewsCom, http://www.printthis.clickability.com/pt/cpt?expire=&title=Rising+Political+Violence+Re... 3 It is alleged that at least 70 000 youths would be trained by the end of May 2011 in intimidating and unleashing violence on opposition party supporters. 15