3
the state, these informal structures successfully destroyed all opposition and created a climate of
terror.
This phenomenon of "informal repression" is, by its very nature, difficult to
investigate. The government is able to present itself as above the conflict, an
impartial enforcer of law and order. It is often both very difficult and risky for
human rights groups to gather sufficiently detailed evidence to call the government
to account for human rights abuse. The problem of evidence is exacerbated by the
fact that such informal restrictions on free expression are often a rural
phenomenon. Increasingly, in many African countries, there is a gap between the
towns, where a free press and political opposition are allowed to function relatively
openly, and the rural areas where freedom of expression is not permitted and the
ruling party and surrogate bodies continue to restrict political activities. When the
urban press tries to report on informal repression, as in Kenya, it too becomes
subject to reprisals. Informal restrictions on freedom of expression can also
operate in less overtly violent ways. For example, the control of food relief or other
forms of patronage can be used to influence political activity and to mute criticism.
The use of traditional authorities to create an atmosphere of fear and intimidation
can be as effective as outright violence in restricting free expression and often
creates a culture of self-censorship amongst journalists3.
We have a number of highly undesirable phenomena in Zimbabwe: child soldiers, or more
accurately the youth, and informal repression. And when the two come together, with all the
apparatus of formal state repression, as in the case of Zimbabwe, the effects are very
disturbing4. As a recent study on Zimbabwe indicates, Zimbabweans have now all but given up
on the idea that they can live in a democracy 5, and, whilst this report establishes the pernicious
effect of propaganda as an important factor in this situation, the fear produced by two years of
informal repression clearly has had an effect. As one senior Zimbabwean commentator put it,
“when they hold a gun to your head, you do what they say”.
The development of the youth militia:
A crucial component of the strategy for maintaining political power was the use of militia, and
especially the youth as militia. But why the youth in particular?
Since
1980
the
demographic
character
of
Zimbabwe
has
shifted
very
dramatically.
Notwithstanding the depredations of HIV and AIDS, more than 50% of the population is under
the age of 18, which means that a very large proportion of the population was not alive during
the Liberation War, and has no recollection of either the racism of the previous government or
3
See again Article19 (1997), DEADLY MARIONETTES: State-Sponsored Violence in Africa, October 1997, LONDON:
ARTICLE 19
4
The number of reports on organized violence and torture in Zimbabwe is now enormous. A large collection of these can
be seen at www.hrforumzim.com.
5
See Chikwanha, A, Sithole,T, & Bratton, M (2004), The Power of Propaganda: Public Opinion in Zimbabwe 2004,
Afrobarometer Working Paper No.42.