Judgment No. CCZ 7/16 23 Const. Application No. CCZ 17/15 The proposition and its implicit acceptance are clearly misplaced. The term “law” is defined in s 332 of the Constitution to mean any provision of the Constitution, an Act of Parliament or a statutory instrument, or any unwritten law in force in Zimbabwe, including customary law. A private contractual stipulation is patently not a law as defined or as generally understood, let alone a law of general application within the meaning of s 86(2). Accordingly, I take the view that s 86(2) has no direct bearing on the constitutionality or enforceability of the contract of admission and does not take the matter any further in upholding or impeaching the School’s policy of compulsory chapel attendance. As regards the extent to which the freedom of religion may be limited, Adv. Mafukidze contends that, although it may be permissible to limit the right to manifest religious or other non-religious beliefs, the right to hold such beliefs is to be considered as being inviolable. I am unable to discern any justification for this perceived distinction either in s 60 or in s 86 of the Constitution. In terms of s 60(1), the freedom of thought, opinion, religion or belief is accorded the same prominence and protection as the freedom to practise, propagate and give expression to one’s thought, opinion, religion or belief. Both are guaranteed in the same breath and without any express or implied differentiation as to the extent of their entitlement to protection. Equally significantly, s 86(3) specifically enumerates those fundamental rights which “no law may limit” and which “no person may violate”. These include the rights to life, human dignity, not to be tortured, not to be placed in slavery or servitude, to a fair trial, and to obtain an order of