“What is the UN doing? By sending [Dowa] back here they are allowing him to torture another day. If the UN does not help us, who is going to protect us from known torturers?”63 If lack of resources indeed made it virtually impossible for UNMIK to deal with the matter after the “internal inquiry,” then surely this should have been the very reason to give far more time for extradition to be explored? Why the haste to return him to Zimbabwe, knowing that once there nothing would happen to him? Article 6 (1) provides for measures to ensure an alleged perpetrator’s presence “…for such time as is necessary to enable…extradition proceedings to be instituted.” Even in ideal circumstances where one State Party is directly involved from the start in alerting another State Party to the presence of an alleged perpetrator within the latter’s jurisdiction, adequate time for instituting extradition proceedings must be granted. What this necessary time is will obviously depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, but it is unlikely ever to be less than many weeks if not several months. How much more so, therefore, in this case, with all its complications and ramifications: UNMIK, Kosovo, UN headquarters, REDRESS, the UK, and Zimbabwe? It is submitted that the UN ought to have put extra effort into exploring realistic, lawful options instead of rushing into one which has undermined the very purpose of CAT. Even if it had become unequivocally clear in due course that the UK was not going to seek extradition (and REDRESS was still communicating with the UK authorities on the issue when it received the letter on behalf of the Secretary-General), other State Parties might have been prepared to seek extradition. Yet a third option could have been to at least consider setting up a limited ad hoc bench in Kosovo to deal with this one case, financed and resourced outside of the UNMIK budget with the co-operation of other human rights organs of the UN.64 How did it happen in the first place An additional important question is how Dowa came to be in Kosovo to begin with. Zimbabwe has been a member of the UN since 1980, and like all Member States it is entitled and encouraged to participate in its activities, including peacekeeping. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) deals with all aspects of the deployment of UN soldiers as well as UN civilian police officers to the world’s troublespots. It is worth examining some issues relating to the selection of civilian police personnel which have developed since they were first used in the 1960s.65 63 Quoted in the South African newspaper Mail &Guardian, 3 October 2003; see http://www.mg.co.za/Content/13.asp?ao=21389 64 UN organs which ought to have had an interest in seeing Dowa brought to justice include the Special Rapporteur on the Question of Torture, The Human Rights Committee and The Committee Against Torture. It is not suggested that these organs necessarily had the power or the mandate to get directly involved; the point is that the Secretary-General and UNMIK ought to have looked creatively for a solution, instead of simply sending Dowa back to Zimbabwe. Given the speed with which events happened it appears unlikely that there was any serious liaison amongst the human rights experts and officials within the UN as a whole. Instead, the ‘easy option’ was chosen: an option which missed a golden opportunity to bring an alleged torturer within the UN’s own ranks to trial. 65 Generally on the role of DPKO see http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/home.shtml 14