INDEPENDENCE OF THE ZIMBABWE ELECTORAL COMMISSION
ZESN
The independence of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (hereafter, “the
Commission”) is a critical issue in the management and conduct of elections. It
has the role of the umpire in the elections and for that reason must exercise its
powers fairly and impartially treating each contestant equally and without fear or
favour. Unfortunately, the Commission and its predecessor, the Electoral
Supervisory Commission have been blighted by criticism of bias towards the
ruling party.
The performance of the Commission in the 2008 in particular left much to be
desired given the inordinate delays in releasing the Presidential elections results
and its recognition of the result of what was essentially a sham June Presidential
Run-off elections notwithstanding the allegations of extreme violence in the lead
up to that election. Critics of the Commission’s performance argue that the
reason for its biased and compromised performance is that it was essentially held
captive by the ruling party.
For example, through the President, the ruling party had the power to appoint
Commissioners and the government controlled the Commission’s financial
resources. Its normal functions, like voter registration, were also outsourced to
other bodies such as the Registrar-General’s Office, also severely criticised for its
bias towards the ruling party. Politicians also had powers to control certain
procedures such as the accreditation of election observers which meant
contestants in an election had the power to choose monitors that suited their
agenda. This, among other weaknesses, exposed the Commission and left it at
the mercy of politicians who could easily manipulate it.
A key weakness is that the status of the body that runs elections has never been
given due respect and recognition. This is a body that is responsible for the most
important political process in a country. As such it must be recognised as having
the same or similar status to arms of the state such as the judiciary. Indeed, the
independence of the Commission is as vital as the independence of the judiciary
and similar principles and rules applicable to a judiciary should be imported, with
necessary modifications, to apply to the Commission.
A starting point is that the Commission must be given exclusive control of the
electoral process so that there is no dilution of its authority.
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ZESN therefore recommends that the Commission must be given
full control of the registration of voters and the maintenance of the
voters’ roll. This should not be shared with the Registrar-General’s
Office.
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Second, on the accreditation of voters, political interference must
be minimised by giving full control to the Commission as the
gatekeeper of the election observers’ accreditation process and
the object of ministers to observers should not be given special
status. Contestants in elections should never be given the liberty
to choose who monitors their performance. This must be the
exclusive power of the referee, in this case the Commission.
The appointment of Commissioners (and their removal from office) are critical
factors in the determining the independence of the Commission. Prior to the
current inclusive government that emerged from the political negotiations, there
was excessive control of the process by the President and the ruling party.
Although the President was required to consult the Judicial Services Commission
in appointing the Chairman of the Commission, there was no obligation for him to
comply with the advice of the Commission. He was only required to report to the
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