However, Section 6.2 (1) also considers the president to be part of the legislature. Guaranteed independence of Section 8.3 directs that the This protects the judiciary from each of the branches from the courts must operate interference by any of the other independently and subject to the two branches. influence/control of the other law only. Section 8.19 provides that the president appoints judges from a list of nominees submitted to him by the Judiciary Services Commission after the JSC would have conducted public interviews. This reduces the chances of the president appointing his loyalists onto the bench and the aspect of public interviews introduces transparency in the process of appointing judges. Section 8.21 requires that magistrates be appointed by the JSC and “all the appointments must be made transparently and without favour or prejudice” Where the JSC is deemed to be independent, then this reduces the risk of having party loyalists seated in court as magistrates. There is no provision that indicates how the Judiciary Services Commission will be appointed. Section 8.19 is vague and at worst gives the president the power to appoint the JSC on his own. This creates a risk of having the current JSC continuing being in office after this constitution and the question is how much confidence do Zimbabweans have in the current JSC Section 8.26 provides for the removal of a judge from the bench by the president following recommendations by a tribunal which the president chooses. This procedure remains vulnerable to political manipulation and does not guarantee security of tenure for the members of the judiciary. Furthermore, it creates the risk of the president appointing his loyalists into the JSC. 27