2016 GFNERAL LAWS AMENDMENT No.3 22. By the repeal of section 1% and the substitution of the following sections- "196 Liability of principals (1) Subject to this Part, where a person having authority, whether lawful or otherwise, over an actual perpetrator authorises the actual perpetrator to commit a crime(a) knowing that the actual perpetrator intends to commit the crime; or (b) realising that there is a real risk or possibility that an actual perpetrator intends commit a crime; and the person so authorising is not present with the actual perpetrator during the commission of the crime, the conduct of the actual perpetrator shall be deemed also to be the conduct of that person (hereafter in this Part referred to as "the principal"). (2) Subject to sections 196B and 200, the liability of a principal shall not differ in any respect from the liability of the actual perpetrator, unless the principal satisfies the court that there are special circumstances peculiar to him or her or to the case (which circumstances shall be recorded by the court) why the same penalty as that imposed on the actual perpetrator should not be imposed on him or her. (3) Where the actual perpetrator of a crime authorised by a principal is entitled to rely upon a defence referred to Part V or VI of Chapter XIV or any other defence which excuses the actual perpetrator from liability or reduces his or her liability for the crime concemed(a) the principal shall be liable as if he or she is the actual perpetrator; and (b) the principal shall not be entitled to rely upon that defence unless he or she would be entitled to rely upon it if he or she were charged as an actual perpetrator ofthe crime concerned. (4) A person charged with being the principal of a crime may be found guilty as a co-perpetrator of the crime or of assisting the actual perpetrator of the crime as an accomplice or accessory if such are the facts proved. 196A Liability of co-perpetrators ( 1) If two or more persons are accused of committing a crime in association with each other and the State adduces evidence to show that each of them had the requisite mens rea to commit the crin1e, whether by virtue of having the intention to commit it or the knowledge that it would be committed, or the realisation of a real risk or possibility that a crime of the kind in question would be committed, then they may be convicted as co-perpetrators, in which event the conduct of the actual perpetrator (even if none of them is identified as the actual perpetrator) shall be deemed also to be the conduct of every co-perpetrator, whether or not the conduct of the co-perpetrator contributed directly in any way to the commission of the crime by the actual perpetrator. (2) The following shall be indicative (but not, in themselves, necessarily decisive) factors tending to prove that two or more persons accused of committing a crime in association with each other together had the requisite mens rea to commit the crime, namely, if they87