There were no differences in the frequency of pre-transitional justice mechanisms, with similar frequencies of the use of all mechanisms. There were two differences in the use of post-transitional justice mechanisms. One was significantly more frequent, the use of Foreign Criminal Prosecutions for Military regimes,15 whilst the other, Vettings, was approaching significance.16 Table 18: Comparison of Post-Transitional Justice Mechanisms (Civilian vs. Military Regimes) Civilian Military Amnesty 70% 82% Truth Commission Domestic Criminal Prosecutions 26% 43% 89% 93% Civil Trials Foreign criminal prosecutions 7% 18% 7% 32% Reparations 30% 18% Vettings 44% 21% Customary justice 4% 11% Finally there were no differences in the Freedom statuses between the two types of regime, with a near-equal distribution between those that were Free, Partly Free, and Not Free. Thus, the types of transition, and the use of transitional justice mechanisms did not seem related to the over democratic status of the two types of regime. 4.4.2 Institutional versus Individual Authoritarian regimes The contrast between Institutional and Individual authoritarian regimes seemed to show more differences, presumably because the stakes in transition are likely to be considerably higher for an individual leader than for a collective leadership. However, it is interesting that Individual regimes were significantly more likely to be associated with state-created or regime-led negotiated transitions.17 As was the case with the Civilian-Military contrast, there were no differences in the frequencies of pre-transitional justice mechanisms, but a number of differences in the frequency of the use of transitional justice mechanisms in the posttransition period. Table 19: Comparison of Post-Transitional Justice Mechanisms (Civilian vs. Military Regimes) Institutional Individual Amnesty 69% 89% Truth Commission 31% 41% Domestic Criminal Prosecutions 89% 100% Civil Trials 0% 26% Foreign criminal prosecutions 23% 19% Reparations 23% 26% Vettings 15% 52% Customary justice 8% 7% As can be seen in Table 19, there was a greater frequency of both Civil Trials and Vettings in the post-transition period for Individual authoritarian regimes.18 It is not immediately evident why these two mechanisms should be more frequent, but it is worth noting that the majority 15 Civilian vs. Military regimes: Domestic Criminal Prosecutions;χ² 5.39 (p=0.025) Civilian vs. Military regimes: Vettings; χ² 3.38 17 Institutional vs. Individual: State-creation; χ² 4.47 (p=0.05); Negotiated regime-led;χ² 5.72 (p=0.025) 18 Institutional vs. Individual: Civil Trials; χ² 7.96 (p=0.001); Vettings; χ² 7.96 (p=0.001 16 21