(65%) of these regimes were Military-Individual regimes. It is also evident that were greater frequencies in the use of Amnesties, Truth Commissions and Domestic Criminal Proceedings in countries in transition from Individual authoritarian regimes. As was found for the Civilian-Military contrast, the freedom status of these countries, 2006 to 2014, showed a similar distribution for both types of regime. Finally, and for both sets of comparison, the use of transitional justice mechanisms, pre and post-transition, was examined. Table 20: Transitional justice mechanisms compared; Pre and Post-transition Civilian Military Institutional Individual Pre-transition 1.9 (0.9) 1.8 (0.8) 2 (0.96) 1.7 (0.74) Post-transition 2.8 (1.2)** 3.1 (1.4)*** 2.6 (1.21)* 3.2 (1.5) *** 19 As can be seen from Table 20, the increase in transitional justice mechanisms, from pretransition to post-transition, was significant for all forms of regime, save that the effect was the least for regimes that were based in civilian-institutional forms. The largest difference, pre and post-transition, was for military and individual authoritarian regimes. There was a very significant difference between Civilian and Military regimes in the longevity of the former, generally lasting more than twice as long as the latter 20, but this is simply explained by the presence of former communist regimes – classified as authoritarian by Polity IV, but the same trend was observed for the contrast between Institutional as opposed to Individual types of regimes, albeit not as strong a trend.21 4.5 Conclusions on quantitative findings As Olsen, Payne and Reiter (2010) point out, quantitative analysis of transitional justice can lead to new insights that are rarely available from the study of individual mechanisms, and the ITJDBP data is a considerable help here. The question at issue here was an examination of transitional justice mechanisms in a pre-transitional setting, in countries making the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. Obviously an implicit question here is whether the use of such mechanisms made any difference to the transition, and, relatedly, whether the use of such mechanisms, post-transition, also made any difference. Perhaps the first conclusion is perhaps not very comforting. There does not seem to be much change in the status of the countries included in this analysis: as was seen (Figure 1), countries have maintained their status over time, and whether a country was Free, Partly Free, or Not Free according to the Freedom House Democracy Index, the status of these countries has remained largely the same over the period 2006 to 2014. As many commentators have pointed out, democracy is under assault (Carothers. 2002; Diamond. 2008; Fukayama et al. 2014), and one evident lesson is that transitions are highly complex and very individual: we have learned that one shoe does not fit all; and that each country must chart a course suitable to its own context. 19 * p=0.05; **p=0.01; *** p=0.001 20 Civilian vs. Military; (Mean, 32 years vs.14 years); p=0.0001. Institutional vs. Individual; (Mean, 18 years vs. 27 years); p=0.06). 21 22