Judgment No CCZ 8/16 23 Const. Application No CCZ 48/15 The established approach espoused in constitutional interpretation is to adopt a purposive and generous rather than a pedantic or restrictive interpretation. As was enunciated in the celebrated decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd (1985) 1 SCR 295, at 344: “The meaning of a right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter was to be ascertained by an analysis of the purpose of such a guarantee; it was to be understood, in other words, in the light of the interest it was meant to protect. In my view, this analysis is to be undertaken, and the purpose of the right or freedom in question is to be sought, by reference to the character and larger objects of the Charter itself, to the language chosen to articulate the specific right or freedom, to the historical origins of the concepts enshrined, and where applicable, to the meaning and purpose of the other specific rights and freedoms with which it is associated within the text of the Charter. The interpretation should be …….. a generous rather than a legalistic one, aimed at fulfilling the purpose of the guarantee and securing for individuals the full benefit of the Charter’s protection.” In similar vein, it was recognised in State v Zuma 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC), at para. 14, that a Constitution requires: “a generous interpretation …….. suitable to give to individuals the full measure of the fundamental rights and freedoms referred to.” Extrapolating from these authorities, the preferable approach to the construction of an enactment is to interpret and apply it in a manner that accords with the overall tenor of the Constitution and is liberal, generous and purposive in its impact on fundamental rights, insofar as this is possible without doing violence to its scope and objects. The adoption of the approach that I commend in the construction of Part XX of the Prisons Act would, to use the words of MAHOMED CJ in Tcoeib’s case (supra), “constitute a sufficiently concrete and fundamentally realisable expectation of release adequate to protect the prisoner’s right to dignity”. It would thus attain the constitutional objective of