Under the present Constitution, administrative officers — i.e., members of the Public Service — are indirectly appointed by the President as their appointments are governed by an Act of Parliament, namely the Public Service Act, which confers the power of appointment on the Public Service Commission, which is itself appointed by the President [see below]. The Attorney-General and Permanent Secretaries, are appointed directly by the President after consultation with the Commission, though since the GPA, when appointing them the President is supposed to get the agreement of the Vice-Presidents, the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Ministers. While there can be no objection to the President appointing politicians as Ministers to assist him in running the government, appointing members of the civil service is a very different matter. They are supposed to form the permanent administration of the country, and if the political head of government chooses them either directly or indirectly then political considerations will inevitably influence their appointment. Although suggestions have been made for provision of parliamentary oversight of senior appointments by requiring them to be ratified by Parliament, that also might introduce an undesirable political element into what should be a non-partisan process. Under the new constitution, the appointment of at least senior members of the civil service and in particular the Attorney-General and Permanent Secretaries should be made by an independent commission. 5. Power to appoint members of constitutional commissions Under the present Constitution, the President appoints the members of all constitutional commissions. In appointing members to the service commissions — the commissions responsible for the security forces and the Public Service — he must act on the advice of his Cabinet and with the approval of the Prime Minister. When appointing members of the so-called independent commissions, namely the Electoral Commission, the Anti-Corruption Commission, the Media Commission and the Human Rights Commission, he is limited to nominees chosen by Parliament’s Standing Rules and Orders Committee — and under the GPA in theory he must also get the consent of Cabinet and the Prime Minister to these appointments. Obviously, the new constitution must ensure that the members of all constitutional commissions are appointed through a process that enables the commissions to exercise their functions even-handedly and without partisan interference. The procedure currently applicable to the independent commissions should be extended to the service commissions. It could also be improved by involving the public more closely in the nomination process, for example by: • publishing the criteria for selection of candidates, so that the public know, and can criticise, if necessary, the basis on which candidates will be considered; • publishing lists of candidates for nomination, and inviting the public to comment on those candidates; • selecting candidates through interviews conducted in public. In addition, the selection of candidates should be put in the hands of a special parliamentary appointments committee rather than the Standing Rules and Orders Committee, as suggested in the NCA draft constitution and the model constitution produced by the Law Society. 41