the  MDC-­‐A  at  council  level,  acknowledging  that  it  was  a  two-­‐horse  race  and  feeling  they  had  little   option.  While  the  winning  candidates  undoubtedly  won  and  were  justified  in  accusing  those   protesting  as  being  undemocratic,  this  did  not  prevent  a  great  deal  of  ill  feelings  around  the   mayoral  election.  Ultimately,  an  mayor  of  Ndebele  origin  was  elected,  35  year  old  lawyer  Mguni,   while  Kambarani  was  elected  Deputy,  in  defiance  of  a  directive  from  Chamisa.35  The  resentment   around  what  were  seen  as  somewhat  undeserving  and  rather  young  council  candidates  is  one   factor  resulting  in  MDC-­‐A  failing  to  achieve  a  50%  vote  in  Bulawayo  for  the  first  time.         6.     Conclusion     The  three  Matabeleland  provinces,  once  considered  key  by  the  opposition  in  any  election,  have    dwindled  both  in  their  support  for  the  opposition,  particularly  at  House  of  Assembly  level,  and  in   their  national  relevance  in  terms  of  the  power  of  their  vote  to  bolster  the  presidential  ambitions  of   any  opposition  candidate.  Numerically,  the  voting  population  of  these  three  provinces  has  not   increased  at  the  same  rate  as  that  in  other  provinces,  particularly  in  Bulawayo  and  Matabeleland   South.  Whereas  Manicaland’s  vote  has  increased  to  230%  of  its  2000  vote,  and  Harare’s  vote  has   increased  to  198%,  Bulawayo’s  vote  has  increased  only  to  125%  of  its  2000  vote.       This  year  for  the  first  time  since  2000,  the  main  MDC  opposition  grouping  failed  to  achieve  a  50%   vote  in  all  three  Matabeleland  provinces.  The  reasons  for  this  are  multiple,  including  that  many   voters  were  convinced  by  ZANU  PF’s  representation  of  itself  as  a  new  party,  capable  of  reinventing   itself  with  Mugabe  gone  at  last.  The  failure  of  the  main  MDC-­‐A  opposition  to  be  visible  beyond  its   star  rallies,  or  to  convey  what  it  stood  for  that  would  be  any  different  to  the  neo-­‐liberal  economic   message  of  ZANU  PF,  also  played  a  role  in  its  failure  to  secure  votes  in  this  part  of  the  country  -­‐  as   did  the  perception  that  many  candidates  were  imposed,  absent,  or  untried.  On  the  other  hand,   Chamisa  personally  won  a  clear  majority  of  votes  in  Matabeleland  North  and  Bulawayo.  Chamisa   consistently  did  better  than  the  MDC-­‐A  in  almost  all  constituencies,  and  clearly  many  voters  voted   for  other  parties  at  the  level  of  House  of  Assembly  level,  and  for  Chamisa  at  the  presidential  level.       It  is  a  poorly  assessed  assumption  for  rural  areas  to  be  judged  as  having  supported  ZANU  PF  en   masse,  even  where  ZANU  PF  won  most  of  the  seats:  in  Matabeleland  South,  where  ZANU  PF  won   12  out  of  13  seats,  47%  of  the  votes  cast  were  not  for  ZANU  PF,  and  in  Matabeleland  North,  more   than  60%  of  votes  were  not  for  ZANU  PF.       This  election  has  served  to  underline  that  while  there  were  scores  of  opposition  parties  registered   to  take  part  in  this  election,  it  remained  effectively  a  contest  between  MDC-­‐A  and  ZANU  PF.   However,  in  Matabeleland,  around  a  quarter  of  votes  did  not  go  to  either  of  these  two  parties  at   constituency  level,  indicating  that  there  is  much  work  to  be  done  by  these  dominant  parties  to                                                                                                               35    ibid.     26