(6) The provisions of subsection (1) shall not be held to confer on any person a right to exercise his freedom of expression in or on any road, street, lane, path, pavement, sidewalk, thoroughfare or similar place which exists for the free passage of persons or vehicles.” Page 56 of 1994 (1) ZLR 49 (S) And s 21: “(1) Except with his own consent or by way of parental discipline, no person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of assembly and association, that is to say, his right to assemble freely and associate with other persons and in particular to form or belong to political parties or trade unions or other associations for the protection of his interests. … (3) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be in contravention of subsection (1) to the extent that the law in question makes provision — (a) in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health; … except so far as that provision or, as the case may be, the thing done under the authority thereof is shown not to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. (4) The provisions of subsection (1) shall not be held to confer on any person a right to exercise his freedom of assembly or association in or on any road, street, lane, path, pavement, sidewalk, thoroughfare or similar place which exists for the free passage of persons or vehicles.” An equivalent limitation to that present in ss 20(6) and 21(4) was contained in the shortlived Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Constitution of 1979, ss 128(7) and 129(6), but not in any of the Constitutions which preceded it. Perhaps this was because under the 1961 and 1965 Constitutions the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act was saved from challenge as a law in force immediately before the appointed day and continued in force at all times thereafter (see ss 70(1)(b) and 79(1)(b) respectively); and under the 1969 Constitution the Declaration of Rights was not justiciable (see s 84). The importance attaching to the exercise of the right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly must never be under-estimated. They lie at the foundation of a democratic society and are “one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every man”, per European Court of Human Rights in Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737 at para 49. See also Whitney v California 274 US 357 (1926) at 375; Cox v Louisiana (2) 379 US 559 (1965) at 574; S v Turrell & Ors 1973 (1) SA 248 (C) at 256G–H. Page 57 of 1994 (1) ZLR 49 (S) Freedom of expression, one of the most precious of all the guaranteed freedoms, has four broad special purposes to serve: (i) it helps an individual to obtain self fulfilment; (ii) it assists in the discovery of truth; (iii) it strengthens the capacity of an individual to participate in decision making; and (iv), it provides a mechanism by which it would be possible to establish a reasonable balance between stability and social change. See Pandey Constitutional Law of India 24 ed at p 118. In sum, what is at stake is the basic principle of the “people’s right to know”. See Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) v Union of India (1985) 2 SCR 287.