elections were distinguished not only by the extent of rigging – “seriously rigged”, according to one commentator, and “reaching unimaginable levels of electoral fraud” (Igwe 1994) - but also by the amounts of money that were reportedly spent by the candidates who owned the parties that nominated them. When Nigeria finally organized its transitional presidential elections, seven years and three generals later (in February 1999), the amounts of money that the presidential aspirants had to raise were staggering by any standard. Indeed, they made the amounts involved in presidential campaigns in the USA pale into insignificance. According to Africa Confidential, at a pre-election fund-raiser meeting of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), the eventually successful PDP presidential candidate brought in over NGN 400 million (Int’l $ 11,6 m.) for the party, much of it reportedly furnished by his chief financial backer, now his defence minister, a vastly rich businessman and oil tycoon (Africa Confidential 40(21) 1999). According to unconfirmed reports, the presidential candidate for the coalition of the Alliance for Democracy (AD) and the All People’s Party (APP) similarly secured his nomination because he was able to bring in over NGN 100 million (Int’l $ 2,91 m.) (Igwe 1994) In Kenya the leaders of all the three major opposition parties that were formed to contest the December 1992 elections were multimillionaires. They had to be to make any impression on the then incumbent president, who spent, directly and through his proxies, an estimated KES 2 billion (Int’l $ 208 million) between January and November 1992, in addition to the vast state resources he pressed into service on his behalf (Throup and Hornsby 1998). The presidential hopefuls pumped millions of shillings of their own money into the campaign (Throup and Hornsby 1998). In addition, their wealthy friends made large donations. Thus, the Democratic Party (DP) was said to have the financial backing of big Kikuyu business, while the inner circle of the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-Asili (FORD-Asili) reportedly included the chairman of British-American Tobacco (BAT) Kenya, who had close ties to the Kenyatta family. Even FORD Kenya, with fewer wealthy friends, raised 80 per cent of its central fund, some KES 14 million (Int’l $ 1,45 m.), from “a few large donations from anonymous well-wishers” (Throup and Hornsby 1998). 5. Regulation of Political Parties in Zimbabwe Legal and Institutional Framework: There are no laws in Zimbabwe that compel political parties to register in order to legally exist. As a matter of fact, in Zimbabwe, it is easier for one to form a political party than to open a banking account7! The only time registration is obligatory is during elections when a party wants to contest by fielding a candidate/s. That is, a candidate is required by law to be proposed and endorsed by a certain number of registered voters in his/her constituency and has to pay a candidacy deposit which is returned if he/she gets a certain stipulated threshold of valid votes cast. With the exception of the Political Parties Finance Act of 2001, the development of parties is not blocked by excessive legal regulation. In fact, it is this Act (first enacted in 1992 and amended in 1997 before being repealed in 2001 only to replaced by a ‘new’ by the same title) that explicitly defines a political party as “an association of persons the primary object of which is to secure the election of one or more of its members to a local authority or Parliament” (PPFA, S.2, 2001). From the look of things, the impulse to regulate any aspect of political party activity in Zimbabwe stems from the imperative to constrict the operations of political rivals and therefore any regulations to govern such activities are part of the weapons in the armoury of the ruling Zanu-PF party. In the absence of a dejure one party state, but in the context of the one-party mindset, the regulatory route is irresistible for purposes of asphyxiating political rivals. It is fair to say that in Zimbabwe, the regulatory environment seems to confirm this characterisation. To this extent, the comparatively competitive two-party system that exists in Zimbabwe since 2000 is unwanted and a target for a concerted attack. It may be stressed that though there are more than two dozen parties in the country, Zimbabwe is 7 While forming political parties is easy, maintaining them is not. This explains why, though there are no less than 20 political parties in existence in the country, only four were represented in the first two Parliaments of Zimbabwe and only three had parliamentary representation since 1990. 19