The likelihood of conflicts of interest in all these areas, where policy, legislation and regulation would be called for from time to time, and the probability that the tax office and other state agencies would feel inhibited in performing their statutory functions with regard to such companies are clear. A tax office spokesperson reportedly complained: “We face a lot of hiccups and political interference when we try to investigate companies owned by the ruling party” (Financial Gazette 21 May 1998). For its part, the MDC relies as well as rental revenue from leasing properties in Harare and several provincial centres. This source of party funding contributes 10% of the party income. It may be noted that the MDC party views those Zimabbweans in the Diaspora as potentially a major source of funding and has therefore been making appeals to them. Other small parties do not have similar ventures but Zanu-Ndonga depends a great deal on the funds generated by the business interests of its president, Wilson Kumbula who contributed about 60% of the party’s revenue. Whatever the source of funds, there is no public accounting for the funds raised. This is especially indefensible where a party is recipient of state funding. The accounting of party funds is done within a party and is not meant for public consumption. Clearly, this is any area that needs to be addressed. Patronage: For the ruling Zanu-PF, as is the case with other governing parties throughout the world, an important dimension is the sourcing of resources by virtue of being at the centre of the state. This entails the dispensing of patronage or prebends by those who control the state and its resources. Such prebends are dished out to supporters of the party. Sachikonye comments that: Access to government power and resources ensures that only the ruling party possesses significant means of patronage. Examples of patronage would include jobs and contracts in government departments and parastatal corporations, the construction of roads, dams, schools and clinics in favoured rural and urban districts, facilitated access to credit sources, and diplomatic postings (2006, 4). In short, the power of incumbency gives ruling parties a head start in electoral contests. In Zimbabwe’s case, in addition to owning substantial resources thanks to state subventions since 1992 and returns from business interests since 1980, the ruling Zanu-PF draws on other state resources, such as significant regular coverage on television, radio and in state-owned newspapers. Infrastructure (such as schools as venues for meetings and rallies) is also at its disposal, more so than is the case for the opposition parties, Sachikonye observed (2006, 34). These are some of the issues that need to be more critically examined in reforming the electoral landscape in the country. With regard to broadcasting services, the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Services Act theoretically guarantees equality of opportunity to the state media. However, on the ground, the ruling party has monopoly over the state media, particularly the radio and television. This is evidenced by more than 90% of election campaign news coverage on the state owned radio and television exclusively focusing on portraying a positive picture of the ruling party, its candidates and supporters. In as much as there is minor coverage of the opposition political parties, more often than not they are given maximum coverage either when they are making a joke out of themselves or have uttered statements that work to the benefit of the ruling party. Of late, the main opposition party in Zimbabwe has been receiving a lot of attention from the state owned broadcasters largely because of the split in the party and lately the violent attack of Ms Trudy Stevenson and her colleagues who belong to the Arthur Mutambara faction of the MDC, by alleged youths aligned to the rival Morgan Tsvangirayi faction. Then there is Public Order and Security Act which replaced the notorious Law and Order Maintenance Act. This is also an attempt by the government to limit civil liberties and legalise the control of street demonstrations, public gatherings and other forms of civic action which may be viewed by the state as having the potential of violence or 24