reinforcements to be sent to a place where there is a natural disaster. However, the executive should not be able to use the police force to harass its (the executive’s) political opponents, nor should the executive be able to direct that particular persons be arrested. The Commissioner of Police should be appointed for his professional ability and experience. He should, like all public servants, refrain from commenting on political issues and should not take sides. If he finds himself unable to serve a particular government because of its political views, the only course he should take is to resign. The requirement for the Commissioner to retire after his period of service, if adhered to, would do a great deal to ensure that the Commissioner is not beholden to the executive and that there is a reasonable turnover of commissioners. If there is to be a separate Police Service Commission, it should be more obviously independent of the executive than the present Commission and have greater powers. The provisions regarding the National Police Service Commission in Kenya may be suitable as a model. They provide: “(1) There is established the National Police Service Commission. (2) The Commission consists of — (a) the following persons, each appointed by the President — (i) a person who is qualified to be appointed as a High Court Judge; (ii) two retired senior police officers; and (iii) three persons of integrity who have served the public with distinction; (b) the Inspector-General of the National Police Service; and (c) both Deputy Inspectors-General of the National Police Service. (3) The Commission shall — (a) recruit and appoint persons to hold or act in offices in the service, confirm appointments, and determine promotions and transfers within the National Police Service; (b) observing due process, exercise disciplinary control over and remove persons holding or acting in offices within the Service; and (c) perform any other functions prescribed by national legislation.” Defence Forces The defence forces should be professional bodies, not a group of politicians in uniform. Nonetheless, the executive should, subject to limitations, be able to deploy the defence forces in times of necessity. The South African Constitution allows the President to deploy the defence forces in co-operation with the police service, in defence of the Republic in fulfilment of an international obligation, and obliges the President to inform Parliament promptly if the defence forces are so deployed. The Law Society’s model constitution is somewhat more restrictive, proposing that – “(1) With the authority of the President, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister and with the prior approval of the National Assembly, the Defence Forces may be deployed in Zimbabwe ⎯ (a) in defence of Zimbabwe; (b) in support of the Police Service in the maintenance of public order; or (c) in support of the Police Service and civilian authorities in the event of an emergency or disaster. 69