committed to holding free and fair elections.192 Nonetheless, Malawian Foreign Minister Lillian Patel stated that “we have reiterated that the bottom line for Zimbabwe is a just and equitable land redistribution, which however must be done in a legally sound and violence-free manner.”193 A SADC heads of government summit held in January 2002 “welcomed” assurances by Mugabe that he would allow independent media to function, respect judicial independence, investigate political violence, allow independent election observers, and respect the right to free assembly; while expressing “serious concern” over Zvinavashe’s warnings.194 SADC leaders, including President Mbeki, have criticized the international focus on Zimbabwe at the expense of other crises in Africa and have opposed E.U. and other sanctions. In January 2002, Mozambican Foreign Minister Leonardo Simao accused western countries of waging a propaganda war against Zimbabwe.195 VII. CONCLUSION There are two main explanations given for the fast track land reform program in Zimbabwe. While all parties recognize the legacy of land inequality and the need to address this legacy with land redistribution, they differ on the causes of the current political crisis. Government and the ruling party, Zanu-PF, blame the international donor community and Britain, the ex-colonial power, for the breakdown in the negotiated process of land reform. This argument has force: enduring economic inequalities, especially in land distribution, have made land ownership a fertile political issue for any political party, and the preference of donors for a redistribution process founded on market values has placed obstacles in the way of rapid progress. The opposition, however, led by the MDC, attributes the fast track program to the emergence of a viable electoral opposition, and government efforts to derail the first serious challenge to Zanu-PF rule since independence. Government and Zanu-PF therefore say that the current land reform program is an economic initiative, to redress colonial imbalances. Opposition supporters say that land reform is a political initiative, having more to do with Zanu-PF’s desperate attempt to stay in power than with concerns for land equality. The polarization of this debate in practice has not been helpful to attempts to resolve the land crisis. Human Rights Watch’s concern is that the human rights violations that have accompanied the fast track process must cease. The conclusion of this report is that many ordinary Zimbabweans who might anticipate benefiting from a fair and effective land reform program fear the violence and intimidation of the “fast track” reform. They resent the discrimination in the way that land is allocated, seeing that the process of redistribution has too often favored Zanu-PF members and those who already have influence and status, instead of those in most need. As one resident of a communal area commented to Human Rights Watch: “The way I see it, it is political: before we had a stronger opposition we didn’t have this question of land. If it was really important to the government, they would have done something about it in twenty years.”196 Furthermore, a haphazard land resettlement process without adequate support for resettled populations raises serious concerns that it may create high levels of vulnerability among resettled people and at best simply relocate poverty. Violence against farm workers, farm owners, those living in communal areas adjacent to occupied farms, and opposition supporters, is ongoing. War veterans and supporting ruling party militia have dominated the resettlement process, as has been widely reported. These rural militias can count on non-interference or limited intervention by the police when they commit acts of political violence. The danger is that, once the current crisis is resolved, these militia will continue to terrorize rural areas: the high rate of violent crime in neighboring South Africa offers a stark warning of the possible consequences for the future of violent political mobilization today. 192 “Communiqué of the Committee of Ministers for the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, December 17-18, 2001, Luanda, Angola. In response, the CFU stated that “in the month immediately following that meeting, there were two deaths, two armed robberies, sixty-one cases of assault, twenty-three cases of abductions or barricades, fortyfour cases of illegal evictions of farmers and nineteen cases of illegal eviction of farm workforces recorded in commercial farming areas.” “Background Briefing” submitted to SADC heads of state summit, January 13-15, 2002. 193 “Quiet diplomacy only way with Zimbabwe: Pahad,” SAPA, January 13, 2002. 194 “Summit takes no action on Mugabe, despite broken promises,” SAPA-AFP, January 15, 2002. 195 “Mozambique accuses west of propaganda campaign against Zimbabwe,” SAPA-AP, January 25, 2002. 196 Human Rights Watch interview, communal area, Manicaland, July 17, 2001. Human Rights Watch 42 March 2002, Vol. 14, No. 1 (A)