30 | Zimbabwe Rule of Law Journal and the employee alike, to the employees it affords security of employment.15 The Court held that a primary purpose of the LRA is to give effect to the fundamental rights conferred by s23 of the South African Constitution. The provisions of s1 of LRA are similar to the provisions of s2A of the Labour Act [Chapter 28.01]. Hence the application and interpretation of the provisions is the same. The SCC further ruled that s185 of the LRA provides that every employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed and subjected to unfair labour practices. 16 It ruled that the onus is on the employer to prove that the dismissal is fair.17 The reasoning in the Zimbabwean Zuva case, however, is contrary to the SCC reasoning in the Sidumo case. Right to terminate on notice under section 65 (1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe The SCC ruled further that the Commissioner first examines whether the decision to dismiss was fair or reasonable and that such a decision should be made in light of the rule breached. The SCC ruled that the Commissioner was an independent adjudicator who considers the competing interests of the employer and the employee. The court noted that when interpreting s145 of LRA they ought to do so in a manner that is compatible with the values of reasonableness and fair dealing that an open and democratic society demands.18 The SCZ endorsement of termination in the Zuva case resulted in mixed feelings between the employees and employers. The workers described it as a resurrection of the Master and Servant Ordinance of 1905, while the employers celebrated it as a case that enhances labour flexibility and an entrance to a free market economy. This paper argues that the approach by the SCZ exalted the common law right of termination on notice over a constitutional right, and incorrectly so. The case ignored the new legal 15 See para 55ibid. 16 See para 58 ibid. 17 See para 58 ibid. 18 See para 158 of the Sidumo judgment.