In view of the above observations, the challenge with the involvement of the Minister in the appointment of the Chief Executive Officer, the Secretary and Staff members may amount to interference with the Commission’s independence. In addition, the powers conferred to the Minister to assign persons in his/her Ministry to act as Chief Executive Officer or Secretary of the Commission gives room for partisan appointments and may also lead to imposition of staff to the Commission or the appointment of incompetent persons. In view of the above, we recommend that the government should consider allowing the Commission to appoint its own Chief Executive Officer, Secretary and other staff members without the involvement of the Minister. Conferring staff appointing powers to the Commission without the involvement of the Minister increases its autonomy, control and independence. It is a best practice that the Head of a Truth Commission and the Secretary reports to the Commission rather than to the Minister. Thus, the appointment and dismissal of the same be done by the Commission than a political authority such as a Minister. It is also important to insert a provision authorising the Commission to engage experts in the recruitment of its staff to increase efficiency and effectiveness. Part V: Financial Provisions Part V of the Bill provides explanation about the funds of the Commission, accounts and appointment of the Internal Auditor and auditing of the Commission’s finances. Section 14 defines funds of the commission as those financial resources that shall be used to settle expenses accrued by the commission in salaries, programs and varying administrative costs, calling for diligence and professionalism in managing such funds. The provision also explains how the commission will increase and manage its revenues through donations, grants, loans, or bequests. However, such loans or grants are subject to approval by the appropriate Minister responsible. In the same spirit, Section 14 (3) allows the commission to invest some of its funds, through the Minister and the Minister of Finance. It is positive that the Bill requires the Commission to conduct internal auditing and another auditing process by the Office of the Auditor General. However, it is restricting to the Commission to compel approval by the Minister for any funding towards the NPRC. The Minister may, spitefully, deny funding in a way to slow down the operations of the Commission. In Kenya, Sierra Leone and Nepal, the truth Commissions were empowered to fundraise for themselves without the interference or involvement of the Minister. Section 43 (c) of the Kenyan Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Act reads funds of the commission shall also consist of, “all monies from any other sources provided for or donated or lent to the commission.” On the other hand, Section 12 (b) of Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act of 2000 stipulates that commission funds shall also consist of moneys and resources, “obtained by the commission as gift or donation from foreign governments, intergovernmental organizations, foundations and non-governmental organizations.” These provisions provide the Commissions with power and right to solicit funds for their operations. In the same way, the Zimbabwe National Peace and Reconciliation Commission deserve freedom to request funds or fundraise without necessarily having approval from the Minister. Funding bottlenecks and inadequacy can cripple the success of the NPRC. The “Ugandan Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights between 1962 and 1986 suffered from a 8