in the party in 2005.65 The party also faced a constant barrage of political and legal attacks, as well as repeated bouts of electoral violence from the ZANU PF state. Importantly, the MDC’s discourse on democratisation and broadly neo‐liberal economic programmes, backed by Western countries, was always found wanting, against the redistributive logic of ZANU PF’s land reform process, the ideological legacies of the liberation movement, and the discourse of state sovereignty. Notwithstanding these obstacles the two MDC formations continued to fight elections and in 2008, against great odds, they defeated ZANU PF at the polls, with Mugabe also losing the first round of the Presidential election to Tsvangirai. As a result of horrendous state‐led violence the MDCs were prevented from translating this electoral victory into state power, and the ruling party retained its incumbency at this point through the sheer force of the state. Under the GPA, the MDC formations were always at a disadvantage against a party that continued to control the coercive arms of the state and persistently blocked key reforms in the agreement, despite repeated demands to implement these reforms. Their lack of experience against ZANU PF’s abuse of statecraft quickly exposed the MDCs weaknesses as did other factors, such as the inability of the two formations to work together under the Inclusive Government, leadership indiscretions, growing corruption particularly at local government level, and a failure to claim its successes in the face of ZANU PF’s monopoly control of the electronic media.66 The radical changes in Zimbabwe’s political economy in the 2000s as discussed above, and particularly the reconfiguration of the MDCs’ urban social base, drastically weakened the support base of the MDC‐T in particular, and the combination of trade union activists and the urban middle class that in the 1990s could bring the country to a standstill, was no longer available in such numbers for such mobilization. The effects of economic demobilization and massive diasporisation whittled away the strength of these social forces.67 Both MDCs have begun the process of assessing the implications of the recent defeat and the prospects of another long‐term struggle. In addition to claims of fraud in the recent election, the MDC‐T pointed to a number of internal problems that weakened their challenge. These included: Elite capture of the party by the Standing Committee; absence of intelligence; failure to implement agreed positions; failure to follow up on issues; absence of respect, trust, communication, proper plans, clear fundraising plan, clear campaign                                                              65 B.Raftopoulos and K.Alexander (Eds), Reflections on Democratic Politics in Zimbabwe, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Cape Town, 2006. 66 J.Muzondidya, ‘The Opposition Dilemma in Zimbabwe: A Critical Review of the Politics of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) Parties under the GPA Transitional Framework 2009‐2012,’ in B.Raftopoulos (Ed) The Hard Road to Reform, op cit 2009. 67 J.Crush and D.Tavera (Eds), Zimbabwe’s Exodus: Crisis, Migration, Survival, SAMP, Cape Town, IDRC, Ottawa, 2010.   24